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One of the greatest medical breakthroughs in history has been the advent of vaccines, which have drasti-
cally reduced the chance of naturally contracting many potentially deadly childhood illnesses. However, as
the eﬃcacy of vaccines continues to improve, their safety has become an increasing concern, as the risk of
developing an adverse reaction to a vaccine may have surpassed the risk of contracting the disease.1 Even
for diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (“DPT”) injections, which used to carry the greatest risk of adverse eﬀects
among childhood vaccinations, recipients faced a one in one hundred thousand chance of suﬀering permanent
brain damage;2 this risk is further reduced now that a safer, acellular version of the pertussis portion of the
vaccine is used. “Ironically, as the safety of vaccines has increased, so has public awareness of the potential
adverse side eﬀects.”3
To address these concerns and simultaneously encourage parents to have their children vaccinated, Congress
enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act (the “Act”). The Act consists of two
parts: (1) the National Vaccine Program, which is concerned with improving vaccines, monitoring and track-
ing adverse reactions to vaccines, and supporting eﬀorts by the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) to improve immunization programs; and (2) the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (“NVICP”), which establishes a “no-fault” compensation program designed to eﬃciently and expe-
diently compensate vaccine-injured children and their families.4 This paper primarily focuses on the NVICP
as it is today and proposes recommendations to improve an innovative alternative to tort litigation.
1See S.A. Sturges, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 919, 947
(1986).
2See Elizabeth A. Breen, One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 309,
315 (1999).
3Id.
4See Lisa J. Steel, Note: National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our
Children? 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144, 154 (1994).
2Legislative History
Enacting this legislation was a strong indication by Congress to assume responsibility for the government’s
role in major products liability problems.5 It reﬂects a belief that “the class of injuries deserving compensa-
tion is broader than the class of injuries for which manufacturers of vaccines should be held responsible.”6
However, as Calabresi ponders, why would this speciﬁc class of injured victims be chosen to receive com-
pensation outside of the tort system, rather than others with analogous injuries?7 One possible explanation
is that “vaccines are the only product whose use is required by law.”8 All 50 states require children to be
vaccinated before entering school,9 and HHS estimates that 12 million vaccinations are given to children ev-
ery year.10 In addition, “approximately 56 percent of all childhood vaccine is purchased with public dollars,
including federal, state and local funds; the remaining vaccine is purchased privately.”11
The government’s role in the case of vaccines may be especially important, since relatively few children
can suﬀer devastating injuries, and it is diﬃcult to predict who those individuals will be ex ante. Because
vaccines are given to virtually every child in the United States, even a rare adverse reaction will happen
relatively frequently. “No clinical trial or FDA review could ever hope to uncover such rare events. By their
very nature, they are unpredictable anyway; even if they were observed in a clinical trial, there would be
no way of predicting or warning against future reactions.”12 According to one statistic, of the more than
5See Victor E. Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian, Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform: National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future? 48 Ohio St. L.J. 387, 398 (1987).
6Wendy K Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-Related Injury Abroad: A Comparative Analysis, 31 St. Louis
U.L.J. 599, 602 (1987).
7See Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 Am. J. Comp. Law 657, 664 (1986).
8Susan G. Clark, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 94 Ed. Law. Rep. 671, 674 (1994).
9Some children may be exempted if their parents have a religious or philosophical objection, or the vaccine is contraindicated.
10See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily 4 (1999).
11National Vaccine Advisory Committee, Department of Health and Human Services National Vaccine Program
Office, Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States 9 (2003).
12William M. Brown, D´ ej` a Vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 40 Brandeis
L.J. 1, 43 (2001).
320 million children vaccinated per year, an estimated 500 suﬀer serious injuries and an additional 75 die.13
Because vaccine manufacturers are rational actors and “as a behavior incentive, compensating the most
probable injuries encourages actors to commit resources to preventing likely injuries,” the normal deterrence
methods of tort reform do not encourage these actors to “ineﬃciently commit resources to preventing un-
likely injuries.”14
As Richard Epstein stated, “the ﬁrst rule of politics is that general solutions are often very hard to achieve
because there will be no sponsors to introduce them. Political action does not start with over-arching philo-
sophical theories. It is galvanized by crisis, dramatic incidents, and by the sense of dire necessity.”15 Rather
than representing “expressions of a comprehensive public policy program for disability compensation,”16
the NVICP was a product of strong public emotion, fears of vaccine shortages and ensuing epidemics of
preventable diseases, and perceptions of a litigation crisis that would force vaccine manufacturers out of the
market. Therefore, Congress limited NVICP to a special class of victims of a speciﬁc cause and did not
purport to use this as a model for compensating victims of other injuries.
Before enacting the current structure and organizational scheme of NVICP, Congress considered other alter-
natives, including creating a panel under the HHS to administer a no-fault compensation program funded by
private liability insurance. The panel would be authorized to enter awards up to $1 million, or alternatively,
like the NVICP, plaintiﬀs could reject the award and sue for tort liability, but recovery would be limited to
the same amount.17
Instead, Congress chose to use the existing infrastructure within the U.S. Court of Federal Claims18 and
13Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 353 n.25 (2001).
14Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 815 (1994).
15David G. Duﬀ, Compensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 Harv. J. on Legis.
391, 406 (1990).
16John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 322 (1982).
17See Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384
(1993).
18Initially, Congress considered placing jurisdiction within U.S. district courts; however the Judicial Conference of the United
States and the American Bar Association raised concerns about the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the
4passed the NVICP as part of an omnibus health care package. This decision was inﬂuenced by a number
of factors. First, it was presumably unlikely that there would be a suﬃcient number of claims to warrant
the administrative costs of creating a new independent bureaucracy.19 Second, some members of Congress
and their constituencies may have been concerned with delegating authority to the HHS, who was perceived
to be too heavily involved in administering the childhood immunization programs to objectively adjudicate
NVICP claims.20 Finally, the NVICP may have been a product of strong political opposition by the in-
surance companies who presumably did not want to be the sole source for the fund. Most likely a result
of political compromise,21 Congress chose to fund the program through excise taxes paid by the vaccine
manufacturers and consumers for post-1988 claims. The federal budget’s general appropriations would fund
pre-1988 claims awarded compensation.22
Vaccine-related injuries are unique to other injuries since society reaps many beneﬁts from having mandatory
immunization policies. “The true issue in vaccine-related injuries is responsibility, not fault.”23 According
to a Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) study, “every dollar invested in vaccination reaps an estimated
potential savings of eleven dollars in reduced costs of treatment.”24 Therefore, the excise tax25 on vaccines is
Constitution, prohibiting federal courts from rendering advisory opinions, as well as concerns about the best use of judicial
resources. On the other hand, Article I courts, like the Court of Federal Claims, has jurisdiction nationwide, speciﬁc authority
to appoint special masters, and is not bound by the Seventh Amendment to hold jury trials in suits brought against the United
States. See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized
Decision Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 9 (1998).
19See Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 37 (2000).
20See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 9 (1998).
21Although President Reagan opposed the program based on separation of powers grounds since the judiciary, rather than
the executive, was charged with its administration, he signed the package, in part due to the lack of funding which rendered
the program at least temporarily ineﬀective. However, Congress bypassed a potential presidential veto by funding the NVICP
through an amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, and the NVICP became a reality. See Keith M.
Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384 (1993).
22NVICP went into eﬀect on October 1, 1988, and the Act made special provisions for pre-1988 claims. See Manitoba Law
Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 26 (2000).
23S.A. Sturges, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 919, 934
(1986), citing McIntosh, Liability and Compensation Aspects of Immunization Injury: A Call for Reform, 18 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 584, 609 (1980).
24Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
277, 288 (Mar. 1985), citing Hinmon & Koplan, Pertussis and Pertussis Vaccine; Reanalysis of Beneﬁts, Risks, and Costs,
251 JAMA 3104, 3109 (1984).
25For injuries before October 1, 1988, the eﬀective date of the Act, compensation is from appropriated funds. For pre-Act cases
through 1992, Congress appropriated $80 million per year and $110 million per year after 1992 until no further compensation is
5an appropriate method of funding the compensation fund, since “the parties receiving direct personal beneﬁt
from being vaccinated are bearing the cost of compensating those injured by adverse reactions.”26 Using the
excise tax establishes a link between those beneﬁting from the vaccines and those injured by them.
However, like tort law, “there is no necessary ﬁnancial link between those who cause injury and those who
suﬀer injury; rather, costs are either borne or redistributed according to the social goal to be accomplished.”27
Even if costs were directly borne by the manufacturers, manufacturers often “pass through” some of these
higher costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. However, one statistic suggests that manufacturers
might still bear most of the costs. According to one author, “two-thirds of all companies with at least $100
million in sales charge one percent or less for insurance in their ﬁnal prices, and for another eleven percent,
liability insurance accounts for only two to three percent of the ﬁnal price.”28 However, the true cost might
fall on developing innovative technologies with uncertain attributes, where the perception of high liability
may deter manufacturers from developing more eﬀective vaccines or from entering the market at all, where
presumably more manufacturers would enhance competition and improve the overall quality of vaccines.
In comparison to other highly proﬁtable prescription drugs, vaccines are relatively unproﬁtable, since most
vaccines only require one inoculation in a lifetime. If that one dose exposes the manufacturer to enormous
tort liability, the proﬁt per dose may be comparatively low and the perceived liability exponentially high.29
One statistic estimates that in 1982, “the estimated cost for developing and marketing a single new vaccine
was between twenty and ﬁfty million dollars, while the industry’s total annual vaccine sales were only $172
required for pre-Act cases. See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony,
Specialized Decision Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
11 (1998).
26H. William Smith III, Note: Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 Case W. Res. 207,
251 (1992).
27Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 807 (1994).
28John P. Wilson. The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manufacture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34
Santa Clara L. Rev. 495, 514 (1994).
29See Kelley E. Cash, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is it the Cure for the AIDS Vaccine Ailment? 16 Rev. Litig.
413 (1997).
6million.”30 However, one commentator doubts that the vaccine market is unproﬁtable, arguing that the
small number of manufacturers in the market represents a virtual oligopoly and those manufacturers are
assured of a stable market since all states require immunization before school enrollment.31
In addition to the manufacturers’ fears of liability, insurers began denying the availability of products liabil-
ity insurance or increasing their premiums, as “‘insurance companies are no more eager to lose their shirts
to unpredictably generous juries than are the vaccine manufacturers themselves.”’32 As a result, the only
manufacturers left in the market markedly increased their prices, making it more diﬃcult to maintain high
rates of vaccination. 33 For example, the cost per does of the DPT vaccine increased forty cents from 1982
($11) to 1986 ($11.40), with eight dollars of this price going to liability insurance.34 When liability insurance
costs for vaccine manufacturers were rapidly growing between 1980 and 1986, prices for some vaccines rose
by over 300 percent.35
Some argue that vaccine manufacturers’ perception of their liability risk in the 1980’s was justiﬁed; others
argue that it was simply a perception. According to one scholar, vaccines accounted for ﬁve to ﬁfteen
percent of a pharmaceutical company’s total sales, yet constituted forty percent of its liability claims and
sixty percent of its total insurance costs.36 Between 1980 and 1984, vaccine injury victims demanded $3.5
30Paula M. Simpkins, Rejection of Market-Share Liability for Childhood Vaccine Manufacturers: Shackil v. Lederle Labora-
tories, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 819, 836 (1991).
31Id.
32Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied
to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products? 78 Ky. J.L. 705, 752 (1990), quoting Peter Huber, Safely and Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 287 (1985).
33Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 8 (1998).
34See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (1992), citing Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes Huge Price Increases in Childhood
Vaccines, 232 Science 1339, 1339 (1986).
35Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 8 (1998).
36See S.A. Sturges, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 919, 920
(1986), citing Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine, Vaccine Supply and
7billion in damages, inducing six manufacturers to leave the vaccine market and leaving only two behind.37
Vaccine manufacturers spent an estimated $4.7 million and $9.8 million, respectively for 1983 and 1984,
in litigation costs defending against tort claims resulting from adverse reactions to vaccines.38 However,
manufacturers’ net vaccine sales during 1983 and 1984 were $156.9 million and $190.5 million, respectively,
paying only three to ﬁve percent of their net sales revenues for litigation expenses.39 Regardless of whether the
pharmaceutical companies’ liability fears were well-founded, their perceptions of liability induced them to exit
the vaccine market. “In the period between 1968 and 1977, the number of licensed vaccine manufacturers in
the United States decreased by approximately ﬁfty percent. Within the same period, the number of licensed
vaccine products decreased by sixty percent.”40 Without additional information such as the amount spent
on research and development and the cost of producing the vaccine once it was developed, “the conclusion
that vaccine manufacturers [were] unduly burdened by tort liability seems premature.”41
“‘Whether ...problems with liability insurance arise from a crisis in the tort system or from a bad downturn
in the business cycle of the insurance industry has been and remains a matter of great controversy.”’42
Nevertheless, regardless of the accuracy of their fears of liability, vaccine manufacturers (along with frustrated
parents of injured children seeking relief from litigating their claims in court) succeeded in helping to pass
Innovation 53 (1985).
37See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act,
44 Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1856-57 (1995).
38See H. William Smith III, Note: Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 Case W. Res.
207, 234 n.177 (1992).
39See Paula M. Simpkins, Rejection of Market-Share Liability for Childhood Vaccine Manufacturers: Shackil v. Lederle
Laboratories, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 819, 836 (1991).
40S.A. Sturges, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 919, 935
(1986), citing Office of Technological Assessment Report: A Review of Selected Federal Vaccine and Immunization
Policies 5 (1979). In 1986, there was one manufacturer of the polio vaccine, one of the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine, and
two of the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus vaccine. Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use
of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program 8 (1998).
41Paula M. Simpkins, Rejection of Market-Share Liability for Childhood Vaccine Manufacturers: Shackil v. Lederle Labora-
tories, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 819, 854 (1991).
42Id. at 856, quoting The Committee on Energy and Commerce in H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6344, 6347.
8NVICP. A representative from one pharmaceutical company testiﬁed at the Congressional hearings leading
up to the Act that his company, “‘among others, made a major ﬁnancial contribution to support the IOM
[Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences] study,”’ which subsequently recommended a no-fault
compensation system for vaccine-related injuries.43
NVICP as a Model For Tort Reform?
43Kristine M. Severyn. Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. Pharmacy &
Law 249, 262 (1995).
9Tort reform has long been debated, especially in areas where com-
plex and technical issues of causation are at stake. As one com-
mentator notes,
The American level of awards for non-pecuniary loss, the contin-
gent fee, the vagaries of trial by jury, the relatively liberal avail-
ability of punitive damages, and community hostility toward cen-
tralized state control of substitute schemes that would keep the ad-
ministration costs down, suggest that reform eﬀorts based on the
oﬀering of substitutes will never succeed. Yet, the American tort
system appears to be an expensive, incoherent mess about which
little positive can be said. Society would be better oﬀ without it.44
Because of the many shortcomings of the tort system, includ-
ing protracted and expensive trials, the unpredictability of jury
verdicts and damages awards, ineﬃcient allocations of resources,45
and overdeterrence, provoking many pharmaceutical companies to
leave the area of vaccine research and development, the NVICP
has become a model for many areas of tort reform.
Compensating victims of vaccine-related injuries and shielding vac-
cine manufacturers from liability in order to ensure a steady supply
of childhood vaccines were the main motivations for Congress to
pass the NVICP. The tort process had become too much of a “lot-
tery” where a small number of people received a windfall of com-
pensation, while the vast majority went uncompensated. Instead
of focusing on any misconduct by pharmaceutical companies, the
program focuses on compensating victims for injuries from partici-
pating in a program that yields tremendous societal beneﬁts. “[A]
shift from the emphasis on corrective justice that is the hallmark
of tort law toward forced insurance—a characteristic goal of cause-
based programs—has been decisively made.”46
This “collective liability”47 approach is particularly appropriate in national vaccination programs, where
courts in traditional tort litigation are not accustomed to regulating public risks and making progressive
44Sir Geoﬀrey Palmer, The Ninth Monsanto Lecture: The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, O.K.? 29
Val. U.L. Rev. 1115,1116 (1995).
45One study estimates that only forty-six percent of total expenditures on the tort system went to plaintiﬀs as net compen-
sation. In the area of medical malpractice, Paul Weiler estimates that the existing tort system spends approximately ﬁfty-ﬁve
to sixty cents to provide injured parties between forty and forty-ﬁve cents worth of beneﬁts. See id.
46Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
10choices based on cost-beneﬁt analysis. This comparative risk regulation is outside the courts’ usual venue
of private risks “amenable to rational control through the retail, retrospective regulation that courts have
traditionally applied.”48 Public agencies may be better positioned and competent to overcome the congres-
sional and judicial bias towards speciﬁc and visible victims, and appropriately balance the risks of harm
from approved drugs with the risk of the consequences of delay in marketing new drugs or failing to develop
them at all that produces unknown and unidentiﬁable victims.49 “The ‘go slow’ judicial philosophy is not a
choice between safety and risk. It is a choice in favor of old risks and against new ones. Though they may
prefer to believe otherwise, the courts are incapable of saying only ‘no’ to risk; the rejection of one risk is
always the acceptance of another.”50
The NVICP serves as a particularly eﬀective model for compensation through insurance, rather than tort
litigation, for “diseases which are well understood and for which adverse reactions to vaccines are highly
predictable.”51
Administrative compensation schemes oﬀer greatest promise when the compensation-
triggering “event” features a relatively clear relationship between source, substance, and
pathological condition. ...In such cases, no-fault has the dual advantage of providing an in-
surance principle for awarding compensation and assigning losses commensurate with more
optimal deterrence. When one ventures, however, into the unconﬁned area of mass toxic
harms, administrative compensation schemes share many of the burdens that beset a recon-
structed aggregative tort liability approach.52
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 94-95 (1993).
47See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (1992).
48Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
277, 331 (1985)
49Id. at 308 n.113, citing Seidman, Protection or Overprotection in Drug Regulation? The Pol. of Pol’y Analysis, Reg.
22, 35 (1997).
50Id. at 308-309.
51H. William Smith III, Note: Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 Case W. Res. 207,
240 (1992).
11For diseases with unknown side eﬀects, the causation question—the only issue for the adjudicators to deter-
mine before compensating victims—becomes highly controversial and the proceedings become a “microcosm”
of the very tort system it aspired to replace.
Diﬃculties in Proving Causation
Even with the NVCIP, the “compensable event” is diﬃcult to determine at times. “It is a thorny issue
for medical accidents generally in that the deﬁnition of a compensable event seems suﬃciently similar to
the fault standard in tort to reproduce the uncertainties and attendant administrative costs of that system
thus negating much of the advantage of no-fault.”53 The Vaccine Injury Table (the “Table”) is designed
to facilitate this problem by specifying known adverse reactions associated with speciﬁc vaccines within a
given time period.54 If the plaintiﬀ can show that his/her injury is one recognized under the Table, then the
presumption of causation is in his/her favor, shifting the burden of proof to the government to show that
the injury was caused by a speciﬁc factor unrelated to the vaccine. If the plaintiﬀ’s injury is not within the
Table’s deﬁnitions, then he/she has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine indeed
caused the injury without any presumption of causation in his/her favor.55
The actual implementation of the Table and the corresponding presumption may become as diﬃcult to prove
as causation is in tort litigation. In Shalala v. Whitecotton,56 the Supreme Court held that “a demonstration
that the claimant experienced symptoms of an injury during the Table period, while necessary, is insuﬃcient
to make out a prima facie case. The claimant must also show that no evidence of the injury appeared before
53Craig Brown, Hepatitis C: Eight Questions About No-fault Compensation for Blood-Product Harm, 18 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 217, 221 (2000).
54The Vaccine Injury Table and the Secretary’s Qualiﬁcations and Aids to Interpretation can be found, infra Appendix D.
55See Lisa J. Steel, Note: National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our
Children? 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144, 156-157 (1994).
56514 U.S. 268, 115 S.Ct. 1477 (1995).
12the vaccination.”57 In addition, even if a victim falls a few hours outside the time period speciﬁed in the
Table, special masters are justiﬁed in denying recovery. Although special masters have incredible discretion
in almost every other aspect of the proceeding and evidentiary standards, they generally strictly adhere
to the Table requirements. “The probability that a fact exists in the petitioner’s favor is not suﬃcient to
establish it as true. Rather, the special master ‘must believe that the existence of a fact is more probable
than its nonexistence, before the [special master] may ﬁnd in favor of the party who has the burden to
persuade.”’58
In addition, the Table has not been signiﬁcantly modiﬁed to reﬂect new scientiﬁc evidence since the Act’s
implementation. The Table was “derived based on epidemiological studies of adverse reactions to the covered
vaccines and reports of the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics.”59 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) has the authority to amend the Table as deemed
necessary, usually based on the research and ﬁndings of the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), a division of
the National Academy of Science, and the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines (“ACCV”).60 The
Secretary has recently added Hepatitis B, conjugated and unconjugated Haemophilus inﬂuenza B (Hib),
varicella (chicken pox), rotavirus, and pneumoccocal vaccines to the Table.61
With the exception of adding these vaccines to the program, the Secretary has sought to narrow the injuries
57Id. at 269, 115 S.Ct. at 1478 (1995).
58Elizabeth A. Breen, One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 309, 325
(1999).
59Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 13 (1998).
60See 42 U.S.C.A. §300aa-19(f)(2).
61On August 6, 1997, hepatitis B, Haemophilus inﬂuenza type b, and varicella (chicken pox) vaccines were added to the VICP.
On October 22, 1998, rotavirus vaccine was added. And on May 22, 2001, pneumoccocal conjugate vaccines were added. See
Health Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/dvicprog.htm.
13covered under the Table and deny plaintiﬀs the presumption of causation rather than using her powers to
expand the Table and therefore, coverage under the program. In 1995 and 1997, the Secretary removed
more general and common disorders such as residual seizure disorder and shock collapse and restricted the
deﬁnition of encephalopathy. In their place, the Secretary added rarer and more speciﬁc adverse reactions,
such as chronic arthritis, brachial neuritis, and thrombocytopenic purpura. About 44.7 percent of the claims
compensated through February 1999 were associated with Table injuries the Secretary removed in 1995 and
1997.62 As a result, removing some of the more common vaccine-related injuries from the Table makes
it more diﬃcult to prove causation and receive compensation.63 Most of the plaintiﬀs who ﬁle claims and
receive compensation allege Table injuries. As of February 1999, about 28 percent of plaintiﬀs ﬁled non-table
injury claims and therefore, had the burden of proof to show that the vaccine indeed caused their injuries.
Of these, only 13 percent received compensation, while 35 percent of those who ﬁled Table injury claims
received compensation.64
The Table changes were partly based on the IOM’s studies conducted in 1991 and 1994 that concluded
that there was insuﬃcient evidence to support the absence or presence of a causal relationship between
vaccines and those conditions the Secretary ultimately removed.65 However, the Secretary only removed
a few of those that the IOM concluded there was “insuﬃcient medical evidence to prove or disprove a
relationship,” since IOM found this to be true for two-thirds of the 75 medical conditions studied.66 HHS
stated that it also considered the level of risk of compensating an excessive number of non-vaccine-related
62See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily 12 (1999).
63See Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Can It Still Protect an Essential
Technology? 4 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 9, *51 n.118 (1997).
64See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily 12 (1999).
65See id. at 13.
66Id. n.13.
14injuries for the extremely rare vaccine-related case.67 Unfortunately, HHS has interpreted the Act’s legislative
history as recognizing Table injuries only when deﬁnitive medical evidence establishing causation is available,
while others interpret Congress’s intent as including injuries in the Table until deﬁnitive medical evidence
excludes them, giving the petitioner the beneﬁt of the doubt when causation is questionable.68 According
to the General Accounting Oﬃce (“GAO”), “HHS based its decisions to add or remove Table injuries on
various factors but did not have a clear and transparent methodology to demonstrate that these factors
were consistently applied for each injury Table change. Without such transparency, changes that make
compensation more diﬃcult for petitioners may continue to be questioned by some, regardless of their
merit.”69
One commentator has suggested that like adding vaccines to the Table, any changes made to the Table
should be subject to congressional review. For Table changes, the Secretary is only required to provide a
180-day public notice and comment period and a 90-day review period by the ACCV. “Because potential
table changes require balancing existing knowledge of causation against the spirit of the NCVIA, Congress
should be in the position to make these weighty policy determinations,”70 rather than having the Secretary
unilaterally make decisions currently dominated by uncertain scientiﬁc causation evidence.
Long Adjudications
The program has also been criticized for taking too long to adjudicate claims. The Act requires that special
masters render a judgment within 240 days of ﬁling, exclusive of suspended time. If a special master fails to
67See id. at 15.
68See id.
69See id. at 3.
70Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 364 (2001).
15do so or if appealed and judgment is not rendered within 420 days, petitioner has the right to withdraw the
claim and sue the vaccine manufacturer or health care provider directly in civil court for tort remedies.71
Despite the statute’s clear time limits on when decisions should be rendered after petitioner ﬁles the claim,
special masters often grant delays requested by Department of Justice (“DOJ”) attorneys deemed reasonable
by the special masters.72 In a 1999 study by the GAO, only 14 percent of claims were processed in one year
or less; most took at least two years. This may be partly attributed to the large inﬂux of pre-1988 cases that
were ﬁled before the January 31, 1991 deadline to ﬁle such cases.73 3,263 and 980 claims were ﬁled in 1990
and 1991, respectively, compared to 75 and 125 ﬁled in 1988 and 1989, respectively.74 In 1988 and 1989,
nearly all of the approximately 200 claims ﬁled were processed within two years. In comparison, more than
1,000 cases were still pending by the end of 1995. The GAO’s data is shown below in Figures 1 and 2.75
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The long delays may also be attributed to the fact that in 1990, the DOJ and HHS received additional
funding for staﬀ and expert witnesses to defend vaccine claims and therefore, had increased resources to
challenge more claims where causation was in doubt. After a petitioner ﬁles a claim with the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, the claim is forwarded to the Public Health Service (“PHS”), whose medical experts in the
Division of Vaccine Injury Compensation (“DVIC”) make their initial determination and recommendations
of whether the claim should be compensated under the Act. The PHS Oﬃce of General Counsel reviews its
opinion and forwards it to the DOJ.76 The PHS has 90 days to submit their report to the Court of Federal
71See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(b).
72See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §300aa-12(d)(3)(C).
73See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily 9 (1999).
74Id.
75Id. at 8, 10.
76See Office of Inspector General, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Program Review
16Claims.
Delays can occur at any point along this system, as well as in the production of medical records and other
necessary documents, the entitlement proceeding, and the damages proceeding. First, HHS data show that
the DOJ attorneys often requested supplemental medical records or other information from plaintiﬀs, most
of whom took at least a year to comply. Second, whenever the PHS physician decides that a case is not
compensable, the case is sent to an outside medical expert, who may request additional information to form
an opinion in the case, which then becomes the oﬃcial PHS decision, referred to as the “internal report.”77
Finally, expert witnesses from both sides then take time to review the records, and special masters sometimes
take another year to reach their decisions.78
(1992).
77See id. at Appendix A.
78See id. at 11.
17Limits on Tort Recovery Under the Act
The program is designed to discourage tort litigation for more certain and quicker, albeit potentially less
generous, compensation from the federal government.79 The goal of reducing tort litigation against manufac-
turers seems to have been achieved. In 1986, more than 250 lawsuits were ﬁled against DPT manufacturers;
by 1997, petitioners ﬁled only four lawsuits.80 In addition, Congress hoped that a relatively uniform federal
standard for compensating vaccine victims would give similarly situated individuals comparable compensa-
tion, rather than subjecting victims to diﬀerent state tort laws.81
Some believe that to achieve optimal predictability for vaccine manufacturers with respect to their liability
and uniformity in compensation awards for injured plaintiﬀs, the Act should make its compensation scheme
the exclusive remedy. One commentator believes that although this may invoke some to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute on due process grounds, “the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held
that plaintiﬀs have no vested right to tort claims under state law.”82 However, preserving the plaintiﬀs’
right to sue for tort damages was most likely more politically palatable and therefore, feasible. The non-
exclusiveness of the program’s remedy is not unique to a litigious American society; most countries that have
compensation programs allow claimants to institute a civil action for damages in addition to, or instead of,
the compensation program.83
79See John P. Wilson. The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manufacture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine,
34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 495, 553 (1994).
80See Elizabeth A. Breen, One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 309,
319 n.84 (1999).
81See Mary Beth Neraas, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?
63 Wash. L. Rev. 149, 162-163 (1988).
82Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384, 389
(1993).
83These countries include Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Quebec, Switzerland, Taiwan and United King-
dom. See Wendy K Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-related Injury Abroad: A Comparative Analysis, 31 St.
18Although the Act allows plaintiﬀs to sue the vaccine manufacturers for tort liability, the Act makes sub-
sequently ﬁling a successful tort claim much more diﬃcult. It requires plaintiﬀs to ﬁrst exhaust their
administrative remedies by ﬁling a claim under the Act. If their claim is denied or they are unsatisﬁed
with the level of compensation, only then may they sue the pharmaceutical company in civil court under
restricted theories of liability. First, the Act prevents plaintiﬀs from suing under strict liability, protecting
vaccine manufacturers through the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment k’s “unavoidably
unsafe” doctrine.84 Second, pharmaceuticals are shielded from any claim that they breached their duty to
warn patients by employing the learned intermediary doctrine, allowing them to fulﬁll their duty by warning
the treating physician only.85 Finally, pharmaceutical companies that comply with Food and Drug Admin-
istration (“FDA”) regulations on warnings enjoy a presumption that these warnings are indeed adequate.86
Unless the manufacturer intentionally withheld material information from the FDA or otherwise committed
fraud, no punitive damages will be awarded.87
Some critics argue that these liability shields have decreased vaccine manufacturers’ incentives to invest in
research and development of safer vaccines. Once declared as “unavoidably unsafe,” it implies that there
is nothing further in the vaccine’s design to make it any safer. “By insulating vaccine manufacturers from
strict design defect liability, the Vaccine Act implicitly announces that the Federal Government is satisﬁed
with the current sate of vaccine safety, and that the Government will not use the tort system to encourage
Louis U.L.J. 599, 612 (1987); Geoﬀrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, Vaccine 17 S25, S26
(1999).
84See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
85See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(c).
86See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(2). See also Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product
Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1856-57 (1995).
87See William M. Brown, D´ ej` a Vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 40
Brandeis L.J. 1, 45 (2001). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d)(2).
19manufacturers to improve their vaccines.”88 The exception reﬂects a societal judgment that the beneﬁts of
developing and distributing these products far exceeds the costs borne by the few injured by such products.89
“Among the rationales for this rule is the idea that medical products are of special importance because of
their lifesaving qualities. But it is not the social utility of a product that is at issue in traditional fault-based
design-defect analysis; it is the designer’s failure to adopt an available, practical, and safer design.”90
One commentator suggests a more nuanced approach, rather than blanket immunity that comment k seems to
provide vaccine manufacturers, advocating for the three-part test under Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories.91 The
Kearl test examines: “(1) whether the product was intended to confer a high beneﬁt; (2) whether the then-
existing risk of the product was ‘substantial’ and ‘unavoidable’; and (3) whether the interest in availability
at the time of distribution outweighs the interest in enhanced accountability.”92 These new liability rules in
tort litigation cases may inﬂuence the manufacturer’s risk-beneﬁt calculation when marketing a vaccine.
However, even with modiﬁed liability rules, there will always be some risk of an adverse reaction involved
with any drug, since the manufacturer can only invest a reasonable amount to minimize the small probability
of an adverse reaction. This decision is made ex ante, designed to minimize the probability of a death, rather
than spending a certain amount of money to prevent an identiﬁable death ex post.93 However, jurors in
traditional tort litigation simply compare the loss to the identiﬁable victim before them “against the costs to
save that individual, neglecting the fact that before the accident the loss was only an abstract possibility.”94
88Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44
Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1896 (1995).
89See Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 810-811 (1994).
90George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability? 109 Yale L.J. 1087,
1133 (2000).
91218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1985).
92Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44
Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1900 n.352 (1995), citing Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 464 (Ct. App. 1985).
93See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547 (2000).
94Id. at 587.
20One commentator applauds these restrictions on tort liability: “Immunities and liability limits are the public
risk equivalents of Good Samaritan laws.”95
Second, many argue that shielding manufacturers from tort liability through the learned intermediary doc-
trine may in fact encourage research and development. “By allowing vaccine manufacturers to convey
adequate warnings to consumers through contractual obligations with reliable third parties, pharmaceutical
companies may concentrate on what they do best—researching and marketing new and much-needed vac-
cines.”96 However, the learned intermediary may be insuﬃcient to ensure that parents receive information
about the possible adverse eﬀects of vaccines, and vaccine manufacturers or health care providers should be
required to directly inform patients of these risks. This information would not only inﬂuence their decision
to have their children vaccinated, but would also empower them with the knowledge necessary to recognize
possible symptoms and inform their physician of their child’s recent vaccinations. All of this could facilitate
earlier diagnoses and subsequent treatment to minimize the damage of any adverse reaction to the vaccine.
Direct warnings to patients is required in mass immunization clinics, where courts have found that the
setting lacks a physician’s individual assessment of the risks and beneﬁts of vaccination. Therefore, those
administering the vaccines are required to inform patients of the risks in these settings, and therefore, the
learned intermediary doctrine could be eliminated in all settings where vaccinations are given to children.97
Some argue that the learned intermediary doctrine goes against the very essence of patient autonomy and
95Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
277, 330 (1985).
96Beth L. Eskin, Immunizations, Learned Intermediaries, and the Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn: Mazur v. Merck & Co.,
Inc., 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1297, 1316 (1993).
97See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act,
44 Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1863 n.69 (1995), citing Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968). But see Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931,
934 (M.D. Ga. 1986), aﬀ’d, 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987) (limiting Reyes and Davis holdings to polio vaccines); Johnson
v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine only applies
to physicians who administer the vaccine).
21informed consent, since the physician is only required to inform the patient of the risks that the medical
community deems reasonable to disclose under the “customary practice standard.” If there is any problem
with informed consent, “it seems more to do with the failure to observe that legal duty rather than a lack
of legal obligation.”98 Because the success of vaccination programs has signiﬁcantly decreased the risk of
naturally contracting the illness, the risk of being seriously injured by the vaccine itself becomes material
information and very much relevant to the parent’s informed decision on the value of the vaccination.99
However, physicians are often reluctant to disclose all of the possible adverse eﬀects because most are ex-
tremely rare and the beneﬁts of vaccination greatly outweigh infrequent yet signiﬁcant risks associated with
vaccines. Parents may not understand that the “eﬀective control of communicable diseases depends on
immunizing a high percentage of the population.”100 One statistic estimates that at least 11 percent of
vaccinated children contracted their case of measles from someone who opted out of the vaccination pro-
gram.101 Because many of the adverse risks cannot be “linked in advance to any particular class of patients,
individualized medical knowledge of the patient could not have decreased these risks.”102 A government-
mandated vaccination program that protects vaccine manufacturers and health care providers from giving
direct warnings of the risk of rare adverse events may be needed to minimize moral hazard problems. States
often intervene over parental consent in many areas of the law, exercising their parens patriae power when
doing so is in the best interests of the child and for society as a whole.
98Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 41 (2000).
99See Andrea Peterson Woolley, Informed Consent to Immunization: The Risks and Beneﬁts of Individual Autonomy, 65
Calif. L. Rev. 1286, 1301 (1977).
100See id. at 1310.
101See Ross D. Silverman and Thomas May, Private Choice Versus Public Health: Religion, Morality, and Childhood Vacci-
nation Law, 1 Margins 505 (2001), citing Daniel R. Feikin, et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis
Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA 3145 (2000).
102Andrea Peterson Woolley, Informed Consent to Immunization: The Risks and Beneﬁts of Individual Autonomy, 65 Calif.
L. Rev. 1286, 1294 (1977).
22Because vaccinations are mandatory before children are allowed to enter schools, even if parents knew of
the rare risks of vaccines, they may not eﬀectively refuse the vaccination unless they have a religious103
or philosophical104 objection, or the vaccine is contraindicated for the child. The duty to disclose and the
doctrine of informed consent are based on the desire to preserve individual autonomy.105 “‘One gives an
informed consent to an intervention if and only if one receives a thorough disclosure about it, one comprehends
the disclosure, one acts voluntarily, one is competent to act, and one consents to the intervention.”106 Unless
the parents qualify for one of the state exemptions, they may not be able to refuse vaccinating their child
even if they are aware of the risks.
However, “no interest is served by ...withholding information. Actions of that nature enhance anxiety,
create suspicion and generate criticism, all of which ultimately undermine public conﬁdence and support in
the immunization system. The immunization program is only strengthened by a transparency of its purpose,
risks and beneﬁts.”107 Therefore, the more common adverse risks or at least those delineated in the Table
should be disclosed to parents before vaccination.
Finally, critics argue that the presumption in favor of pharmaceuticals that comply with FDA warnings is
insuﬃcient to protect consumers from the adverse eﬀects of vaccines. “Given that the FDA only evaluates
103All states allow a religious exemption from vaccinations, except for Mississippi and West Virginia. See Ross D. Silverman
and Thomas May, Private Choice Versus Public Health: Religion, Morality, and Childhood Vaccination Law, 1 Margins 505
(2001).
10417 states currently allow a moral or philosophical exemption from vaccines: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See General Vaccine Exemption Questions, at http://home.san.rr.com/via/states/vaxexemptions.htm.
105See Andrea Peterson Woolley, Informed Consent to Immunization: The Risks and Beneﬁts of Individual Autonomy, 65
Calif. L. Rev. 1286, 1295 n.51 (1977).
106Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. Pharmacy &
Law 249, 253 (1995), citing Beauchamp, Informed Consent, Medical Ethics 180 (1989).
107Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 42 (2000).
23warnings based on the information submitted by manufacturers, the FDA’s role in the warning evaluation
process is somewhat ‘passive.’ ...The warnings approved by the FDA, therefore, may not represent the
safest potential warnings, for the FDA may not have considered the full universe of relevant information.”108
Only ﬁve states have accepted compliance with FDA requirements as a defense against punitive damages in
tort litigation.109
However, the U.S.’s FDA approval process is one of the most rigorous in the world, and no drug that aﬀects
the human body physiologically and biochemically will ever be 100 percent safe. When adverse eﬀects are on
the order of aﬀecting 1 in every million children,110 the risks involved in any given vaccine will almost never
be illuminated during the clinical trials, which at most, test tens of thousands of children in a time span of a
few years.111 “The labeling of a product as ‘safe’ by a regulatory agency, therefore, must mean ‘safe enough,’
which implies that the regulatory process entails, implicitly or explicitly, a weighing of beneﬁts and risks.”112
Because the FDA is forced to conduct a cost-beneﬁt analysis for every drug seeking approval, balancing the
risks of releasing a drug prematurely with those of delaying the release of a potentially beneﬁcial drug,
a government standards defense is often unavailable since the regulation often represents a ﬂoor of safety
below which a manufacturer’s drug may not fall.113 However, by engaging in risk allocations through tort
litigation, “courts engage in risk allocations that often contravene the judgment of the FDA, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and the consensus of the medical profession.”114
108Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44
Am. U.L. Rev. 1853, 1885 (1995).
109Those ﬁve states are: Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A
Reckless Act? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 581 n.110 (2000).
110An estimated 1 in a million children who receive the measles or mumps vaccines will suﬀer a serious a reaction, including
encephalitis. See Michael P. Parillo, Allison v. Merck & Co.: Products Liability and the Drug Manufacturer, 4 J. Pharmacy
& Law 245 (1995).
111See Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 539 (1990).
112Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 834-835 (1994).
113See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (1992).
114Jeﬀrey O’Connell and Ralph M. Muoio, The Beam in Thine Eye: Judicial Attitudes Toward “Early Oﬀer” Tort Reform,
24In addition, the FDA and CDC committees that approve and recommend the very vaccines that every child
should receive have been criticized to consist of members who have signiﬁcant conﬂicts of interests, including
patent interests, ﬁnancial investments, and ﬁnancial interdependencies with the vaccine manufacturers seek-
ing approval. This might contribute to the public’s weariness and distrust in the FDA’s seemingly impartial
and objective assessment of the safety of the drugs awaiting its approval. The Act takes these concerns into
account by enabling plaintiﬀs to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence115 that the man-
ufacturer engaged in fraud or intentional and wrongful withholding of information before or after approval
regarding the vaccine’s safety or eﬃcacy,116 or failed to exercise “due care notwithstanding compliance” with
FDA regulations.117 In addition, in response to public criticism leading to an investigation by the House
Committee on Government Reform,118 the FDA renewed its waiver process, asking more detailed questions
of its committee members before allowing them to partake in the committee’s decision-making process.119
Incentives for Pharmaceuticals to Develop Safer Vaccines
The Act’s critics argue that the liability shields and ﬂat tax that funds the program do not give manufac-
turers suﬃcient incentives to develop safer and more eﬀective vaccines. When enacted, the excise tax was
proportional to the level of risk associated with the vaccine; the more adverse events associated with the
vaccine, the higher the tax. However, in 1996, Congress amended the Act, reducing the excise tax to a $0.75
ﬂat tax due to Congress’s desire to reduce the fund’s surplus. Critics argue that the ﬂat tax is ineﬀective,
1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 491, 498 (1997).
11542 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(2)(B).
11642 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d)(2)(A) and (B).
11742 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(2)(B).
118See, e.g., FACA: Conﬂicts of Interest and Vaccine Development—Preserving the Integrity of the Process: Hearing Before
the House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 239 (2000); Majority Staff of House Comm. on Government
Reform, 106th Cong., Report on Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making (2000).
119See infra Appendix B and C for a copy of the FDA’s waiver forms.
25since it does not account for risk at all. Further, the ﬂat tax may possibly provide even less incentives for
vaccine manufacturers to invest in research and development and give consumers a false impression that all
vaccines are equally safe. In addition, it may make the fund vulnerable to bankruptcy if a single batch of
vaccine causes a disproportionate number of injuries and claims, since the federal government has no backup
source in case claims exhaust the fund.120 Instead of analyzing what was causing the mismatch between
VICP revenue and compensation awards, Congress may have “foreclose[d] serious considerations of alter-
native explanations” of the over funding situation.121 Possible explanations might be outdated risk models
that determined the excise tax before the amendments, or less than an optimal number of meritorious claims
being awarded.
In addition, according to the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), as of March 2003,
$895.0 million (62.8 percent) of approximately $1.4 billion in awards and attorney fees were from generally
appropriated funds, compensating pre-1988 claims, rather than from the excise taxes in the trust fund.122
Most of the close to $1 billion surplus in the trust fund is loaned to the Treasury and used for other federal
programs, who then pays interest back to the fund. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (“CBO”) estimates
that within the next decade, the surplus will grow to $2.6 billion, generating three times more revenue than
claims paid out and administrative costs.123 Parent groups argue that the large surplus reﬂects the fact
that an insuﬃcient number of claims are being compensated, while vaccine manufacturers claim the surplus
shows that the excise taxes are too high.124 In addition, the FDA and CDC want to use that surplus to fund
120Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Can It Still Protect an Essential Technology?
4 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 9, *63 (1997).
121See id.
122Heath Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Monthly Statistics Report (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/monthly.htm.
123See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily 18 (1999).
124Id.
26vaccine-related research, including the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (“VAERS”) and general
research examining causation links between vaccines and chronic conditions,125 risk factors to help predict
who will suﬀer from adverse reactions, and developing safer vaccines. Any changes in how the trust fund
surplus is allocated will signiﬁcantly aﬀect the federal government’s general budget.
125See id.
27As long as the fund is running a surplus, one commentator proposes giving pharmaceutical companies risk
rebates—returns on their contributions of the excise tax, proportional to its safety.126 “Since the ﬂat tax
will be actuarially set above the minimum revenue needed to run the program, part of the surplus funding
would be returned to manufacturers based on how much the VICP paid to petitioners for injuries from that
particular manufacturer’s vaccine. The money remaining in the Trust fund after the VICP pays the rebates
would be used to expand the VICP’s coverage.”127 The actual amount paid in taxes would be proportional
to the number of doses a manufacturer produces. Therefore, each manufacturer would contribute to the
fund in proportion to its total share in the vaccine market, including all of the vaccines it produces. Higher
rebates would go to those manufacturers with the safest vaccines; however, higher rebates might, in turn,
go to those who have less well-known side eﬀects and therefore, harder to establish claims, and produce
perverse incentives. The eﬀect such rebates would have on manufacturers’ behavior is diﬃcult to predict.
On the one hand, the risk rebate system may potentially have some disincentives for manufacturers from
producing riskier vaccines. At the same time, it may also give them incentives to make those particular
vaccines safer and more eﬃcacious.
Some argue that the risk rebate system altogether goes against the spirit of the NVICP, since the main
purpose of a no-fault compensation program is to compensate those injured by the vaccines, rather than
assigning costs to the vaccine manufacturer who may or may not be at fault. Calabresi argues that coupling
damages and compensation with the behavior of the individual injurer is deeply ﬂawed. “If no activity—
whether injurer, victim, or mixed—were statistically linked to greater accident proneness, the fund-tax
would automatically, by deﬁnition almost, become a general one, and the accident risk would automatically
be treated as a socialized risk of living.”128
In Calabresi’s opinion, a better approach is that taken by Sweden, which requires vaccine manufacturers to
28contribute directly to a fund established by voluntary agreement with a consortium of insurance companies
who jointly wanted to establish a scheme that complemented the country’s existing medical insurance pro-
grams.129 The Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance’s funding is based entirely on levies on the pharmaceutical
industry. In 1986, the premium for the insurance amounted to approximately $2.4 million, corresponding to
about 0.4 percent of the industry’s total business volume in Sweden.130 According to Calabresi, “the clearest
advantage is that by employing essentially private insurance devices and rates that are presumably actu-
arially set, the Swedish approach avoids the danger of hidden political tinkering with the amounts charged
to risk-prone categories.”131 Calabresi strongly favors having private insurers make presumably objective
decisions based on actuarially based assessments, rather than American politicians making tax assessment
decisions based on special interest groups and other governmental pressures. In his opinion, Sweden’s ap-
proach best accomplishes most of the general goals of accident law: deterrence, compensation, distributing
burdens of accident and safety costs on those most suited to bear them by reason of wealth or status in
society, and eﬃciency.132
129See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (1992).
130See Carl Oldertz, Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden, 34 Am. J. Comp. L.
635, 654 (1986).
131Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 Am. J. Comp. Law 657, 662 (1986).
132See id. at 658. For a more detailed discussion of Sweden’s compensation program, see infra Comparisons with Other
Vaccine Compensation Programs.
29NVICP’s Successes
Legislative intervention almost always has important consequences
that lawmakers were unable to foresee and predict—consequences
which may become foreign to the original legislative purpose.133
Many critics believe that the NVICP has become such an inter-
vention. However, “despite the criticisms, no commentator has
argued that Congress should repeal the NVICP. ...All things con-
sidered, ...the NVICP appears superior to relying on the tort sys-
tem alone.”134
One of the main criticisms of the program is that it has become as adversarial as the tort system it as-
pired to replace. “Program participants have ‘traded’ Department of Justice counsel in place and stead of
pharmaceutical industry defense counsel, the attorneys they would have faced in traditional litigation.”135
However, there are distinct diﬀerences that the program tries to implement to reduce the adversarial nature
and thus, the litigation costs incurred by both parties.
One such approach is a lax discovery process. For example, special masters use “Rule 5 conferences”136 to
meet with both parties and their respective counsel after reviewing the reports from both the plaintiﬀ and
the DOJ. During this conference, the special master: “(1) gives each party an opportunity to address the
other’s position, (2) states a tentative view as to the merits of the case, and (3) establishes with the parties
what issues remain to be addressed and the most eﬃcient means for deciding those issues.”137 Because
133See Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t That the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It’s Just that the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49
Rutgers L. Rev. 485, 491 n.29 (1997).
134Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384, 388
(1993).
135Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. Pharmacy &
Law 249, 265 (1995).
136The Vaccine Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims govern all proceedings before the Oﬃce of Special Masters or any
judge on the Court of Federal Claims under the NVICP. Vaccine Rule 5 gives special masters guidelines for conducting this
“pre-trial” conference. See Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, Appendix J, Vaccine Rule 5 (2001).
137Office of Special Masters, United States Court of Federal Claims, Guidelines for Practice Under the Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 9 (2002).
30the pretrial discovery process is one of the most expensive aspects of tort litigation,138 presumably this
“pre-trial” conference facilitates resolution and minimizes strategic litigation tactics.
In addition, over the history of the NVICP, special masters have reversed approximately 44 percent of the
post-1988 cases (and roughly 30 percent of pre-1988 cases) that the PHS branded as non-compensable and
the DOJ argued before a special master.139 For post-1988 claims, from FY 1989 to FY 2003 (through
March 31, 2003), 3,976 claims were ﬁled, of which 1,400 (35.2 percent) were adjudicated. Of the 1,400
claims adjudicated, 613 (43.8 percent) were awarded some compensation, while the rest were dismissed. For
pre-1988 claims, from FY 1989 to FY 2003 (through March 31, 2003), 4,267 claims were ﬁled, of which 4,252
(99.6 percent) were adjudicated. Of the 4,252 claims adjudicated, 1,185 (27.9 percent) were compensated,
the rest dismissed.140 This conclusion assumes that claims that the PHS recommended to be compensated
were not further adjudicated, and those dismissed were ruled in favor of the DOJ or otherwise found non-
compensable.
Perhaps one of the most striking successes of the program is the relative lack of substantive case law regarding
the NCVIP. As of December 1995, of the 3,337 cases where a special master’s judgment was entered, only
twenty-six plaintiﬀs had ﬁled elections to reject the special master’s judgment.141 Therefore, to the extent
that fear of tort liability drove manufacturers out of the market, the program has succeeded in inducing
them to continue producing vaccines. No commercial vaccine manufacturer has ceased vaccine production
since 1990, and wholesale prices of vaccines have declined.142 Therefore, the long-term vaccine supply is no
138See Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t That the Tort Lawyers are so Right, It’s Just that the Tort Reformers are so Wrong, 49
Rutgers L. Rev. 485 (1997).
139See Office of Inspector General, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Program Review 15
(1992).
140Heath Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Monthly Statistics Report (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/monthly.htm.
141See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 23 (1998).
142See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 357 (2001).
31longer a public health concern and those given are safer. “While there are still not many companies involved
in vaccine research and production, vaccines for all the common childhood diseases are widely available.
The current public health concern is getting parents to get their children vaccinated, not the availability of
vaccines.”143
In addition, most of the more dangerous vaccines have been modiﬁed to reduce adverse risks even further.
For example, thimerosal-free vaccines (thimerosal has been suspected to be linked to autism)144 and acellular
pertussis vaccines (the whole cell pertussis vaccine accounts for the majority of adverse reactions reported
and compensated under the program)145 are now given to all children.
Finally, Congress amended the Act in 1998 to eliminate the requirement that plaintiﬀs could ﬁle claims
only if they incurred more than $1,000 in unreimbursable expenses.146 Courts had previously upheld the
constitutionality of this requirement under the Fifth Amendment equal protection clause, since “‘as a general
matter, those who incur only modest expenses or whose expenses are reimbursed from other sources present
less compelling cases for compensation than those who incur large, unreimbursed expenses.”’147 Nevertheless,
Congress amended the Act in order to lessen the burden on indigent families who did not meet the previous
143William M. Brown, D´ ej` a Vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 40 Brandeis
L.J. 1, 45 (Fall 2001).
144In Spring 2002, due to the large number of claims alleging that vaccines had caused autism in their children, the Oﬃce of
Special Masters established a special procedure to handle these cases, known as Omnibus Autism Proceeding. Guidelines for
these proceedings can be found in the Autism General Order #1. See Office of Special Masters, United States Court
of Federal Claims, Guidelines for Practice Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 5 (2002).
145One ﬁgure estimates that 1 in 1,750 children receiving the whole cell version of the pertussis shot will go into convulsions
or become unresponsive. See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug
L.J. 351, 353 n.25 (2001). However, the overall reporting rate of adverse reactions decreased substantially after the acellular
pertussis vaccine replaced the whole cell vaccine in 1996, from 26.2 to 12.5 reports per 100,000 net doses distributed. See Center
for Disease Control, Surveillance for Safety After Immunization: The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) –
United States, 1991-2001, 52 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 1,4 (Jan. 24, 2003).
146See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i), amended by Pub.L. 105-277, § 1502 (1998).
147Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens and Leavy Mathews III, Federalism and Federal Liability Reform: The United States
Constitution Supports Reform, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 269, 297 (1999), citing Black v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
93 F.3d 781, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
32requirement.
Recommendations to Improve the NVICP
Although the NVICP is generally successful, it can still be improved in many ways. Any money saved in
attorney fees, litigation expenses such as fees to pay experts, and other administrative costs leaves more
money in the trust fund for injured victims. For each of the last several years, the total paid from the
fund for program administration expenses for the DOJ, HHS, and the Court of Federal Claims has been
approximately $10 million per year.148 In addition, making the process less adversarial and more generous
in granting compensation will help achieve the original legislative intent to help individuals injured by a
program that society as a whole beneﬁts from.
A Stronger Focus on Public Policy: A More Relaxed Approach to Scientiﬁc Causation
In areas of medical uncertainty, where it is equally probable that the vaccine or another factor caused the
injury, the presumption should be for the plaintiﬀ and compensate the child’s injuries. Congressional intent
suggested that it was more willing to be overinclusive than underinclusive.149 This presumption would be
similar to that employed in workers’ compensation cases, where any beneﬁt of the doubt is resolved in
favor of the plaintiﬀ, in accordance with the program’s public policy. This would also help alleviate the
plaintiﬀ’s burden of proof, since failure to show causation is one of the most common reasons for denying
148See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Deci-
sion Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 11 (1998), citing
Thomas E. Balbier, director, Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Department of Health and Human Services.
149See e.g., The National Vaccine Injury Program: Is It Working as Congress Intended? Hearings Before the Committee on
Government Reform, 107th Cong. (2001).
33compensation.150
In seeking the optimal resolution to disputes, law does not necessarily attempt to reach
an answer that comports with objective criteria. Such criteria may enter into the dispute
resolution process, but other criteria, such as societal mores or public acceptability will likely
dominate the outcome. Indeed, law is often called upon to settle disputes where objective
criteria are absent or inconclusive; society cannot be put on hold while better data are
gathered.151
Although causation is important, special masters’ ﬁndings are ultimately public policy decisions informed
by technical determinations, rather than based on technical determinations only. This may be particularly
diﬃcult in a forum where evidentiary and discovery rules are designed to be lax, causation based on sci-
entiﬁc ﬁndings is the sole issue in dispute, and the adversarial nature of the tort system is often imported
into the proceedings. “Science, as a formal system of proof, cannot oﬀer a precise, complete and consistent
description of nature. 152 ...In a scientiﬁc worldview composed primarily of probabilistic statements, where
a given conclusion is likely one of many within an acceptable range of scientiﬁc opinion, this norm also means
acknowledging competing interpretations.”153
Special masters need to remember that “the evidence might not meet the evidentiary standards of the sci-
entiﬁc community, but that was not what was required; rather, the plaintiﬀ had only to meet the burden of
proof required by the adjudicatory process.”154 Since these proceedings are very similar to traditional court
hearings, special masters may be more inclined to focus only on the individual claimant before them, rather
than the public policies they are there to uphold—policies that should err on overcompensating injured
victims when causation is equally likely to be caused by the vaccine as by some other factor.
The stronger presumption for compensating plaintiﬀs with less emphasis on proving causation with scientiﬁc
150See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 357 (2001).
152Id. at 825.
153Id. at 826.
154Id. at 820, citing Wells v. Ortho Phar. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aﬀ’d, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
34certainty will help reduce the adversarial nature of the proceedings. The Vaccine Rules state that special
masters “shall determine the nature of the proceedings, with the goal of making the proceedings expeditious,
ﬂexible, and less adversarial, while at the same time aﬀording each party a full and fair opportunity to
present its case and creating a record suﬃcient to allow review of the special master’s decision.”155 Special
masters’ decisions can only be set aside by the United States Court of Federal Claims if the decision is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”156 making it even
more important to make the proceedings at the special master level as least adversarial as possible. The
adversarial nature of the legal system including judges and lawyers should play a smaller role in the process
of determining public safety.157 “A more relaxed approach to scientiﬁc causation is justiﬁed by the objectives
of the NCVIA and the understanding of how diﬃcult causation is to prove in these cases.”158
This approach is also important, since special masters who place too much emphasis on uncertain scien-
tiﬁc data may base their decisions on a sort of “pseudo-science of ‘vaccine-ology”’159 that may lend more
credence to the scientiﬁc evidence than it otherwise deserves. One commentator criticizes the program for
invoking legislation that institutionalizes “speciﬁc” causation, providing compensation for some injuries not
yet scientiﬁcally proven to be associated with the vaccines (lack of general causation).160 However, the legal
decision to provide compensation is not solely based on scientiﬁc evidence; policy considerations in moti-
vating parents to have their children vaccinated and protecting vaccine manufacturers from tort liability to
ensure a steady vaccine supply may justify overcompensating “undeserving” individuals. Legal rules regard-
ing burdens of proof, legal presumptions, and evidentiary standards almost certainly “alter the outcome of
a legal proceeding from that which might have resulted if the court only considered scientiﬁc opinions.”161
155See Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Appendix J, Vaccine Rule 3(b) (2001).
156See 42 U.S.C.A. §300aa-12(e)(2)(B).
157See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (Fall 1992).
158Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 364 (2001).
159Id. at 352.
160See Derry Ridgway, Innocent of Empirical Rigor, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 165, 204 (2001).
161Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
35A New Role for Special Masters
Although there is no requirement that special masters be legally trained,162 all special masters to date have
been lawyers. This may partially be due to the fact that they are all appointed by a majority of the judges
on the United States Court of Federal Claims.163 In addition, perhaps attorneys trained and experienced
in balancing legal rules and scientiﬁc evidence with public policy may be the best adjudicators of NVICP
claims. Special masters who are only trained in the sciences or medical profession may tend to focus even
more on the scientiﬁc evidence of causation and lose sight of the public policy they are appointed to uphold.
However, special masters should receive some training on the subject matter and be required to remain
abreast of the newest technological and medical developments. The eight special masters initially appointed
at the NVICP’s inception “attended a two-day educational program sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center
to familiarize them with the medical issues they would encounter in the program. Those who were appointed
later did not receive any specialized training.”164 Special masters themselves believe that “increased famil-
iarity with the scientiﬁc and medical issues was very helpful, particularly with respect to helping them focus
in on the critical issues in a case.”165 In addition, the specialized knowledge and experience would enable
them to ask more probative questions of the experts and other relevant testimonies.
However, one needs to minimize the risk of special masters substituting their “perceived knowledge for evi-
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 820 (1994).
162See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 14 (1998). Congress
stated that since “no-fault vaccine compensation proceedings raise fewer legal issues than issues of medicine, ...masters need
not be lawyers by training.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-386, at 515 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3118.
163The court appoints each special master (never more than eight) to a four-year term, subject to removal only for incompe-
tence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(c)(1), (2), and (4).
164Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 15 (1998).
165Id. at 41.
36dence.”’166 By employing a panel of appointed experts instead of relying on the respective parties’ experts
and the special masters’ individual knowledge and expertise, special masters may be better able to accord
proper weight to scientiﬁc ﬁndings without abdicating all responsibility in reaching an acceptable resolution
by “enthroning the scientist as decisionmaker,”167 and uphold the NVICP’s public policies.
Appointing a Neutral Panel of Experts
One commentator argues that although an appointed, impartial expert would be both more eﬃcient and less
costly, “as long as the system remains adversarial and the evidence of causation so controversial, however,
this is not a reasonable solution.”168 However, because causation is so controversial, appointing experts to
determine whether or not the vaccine caused the plaintiﬀ’s injuries is not only reasonable, but one that will
minimize the adversarial nature of the special master proceedings and reduce general costs to the plaintiﬀs
and government, leaving more money available in the compensation fund for the victims.
In Germany, civil court judges select experts using lists of professionals deemed appropriate to serve as
experts assembled by professional licensing bodies or quasi-public bodies.169 Presumably, special masters in
the United States could employ the FDA, CDC, ACCV, or professional medical societies (such as pediatric
neurology) to generate lists of professionals who could serve on a panel to determine whether the injuries
were caused by the vaccine and not by any other pre-existing condition. There are also a few programs that
were recently developed to help identify scientists, physicians and engineers who were willing to serve as
166Id. at 43.
167Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 821 (1994).
168Lisa J. Steel, Note: National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our
Children? 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144, 172 (1994).
169Eric D. Green, et al. Problems, Cases, and Material on Evidence 931 (2000).
37court-appointed experts. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (“AAAS”) is designed
to receive requests for assistance from federal judges and attempts to identify suitable experts for their
speciﬁc needs and cases. In addition, the Private Adjudication Center at Duke University “has developed a
registry of scientiﬁc and technical advisors to assist federal and state courts, agencies, arbitrators, mediators,
and others who seek assistance in resolving complex scientiﬁc and technical issues,” with a focus on medical
experts.170
From this list of professionals, however generated, a pool of ﬁfteen experts would be randomly selected, of
whom three would be selected to serve on the panel in a voir dire process similar to the jury selection process,
where each party’s counsel has the opportunity to question each prospective expert and exercise a limited
number of peremptory challenges. A voir dire process enables the parties to inquire about any conﬂicts of
interest the experts may have,171 and require that any such conﬂicts be put on record to estop parties from
objecting after the proceedings have commenced and constitute an implied waiver. Those selected would
be mandated to serve on the panel (similar to jury duty, unless extraordinary circumstances or substantial
conﬂicts of interests prevent the expert from serving) and be given reasonable compensation.172 This would
reduce litigation costs signiﬁcantly, since experts and other miscellaneous expenses can reach $10,000 or
more,173 leaving more money in the fund for the victims.
A voir dire process ultimately leads to more procedural fairness and neutrality, rather than delegating
170Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science Panels: Two
Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation 95 n.109
(2001).
171All potential experts could be asked to disclose any conﬂicts of interests using forms similar to those used by Judge Pointer in
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, MDL-926, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992), infra Appendix
A, or the FDA waiver form, used for members serving on its various committees, infra Appendix B and C.
172NVICP could use a fee schedule similar to that of the Judge Pointer’s panel discussed infra, compensating experts at $200
per hour. Alternatively, experts could be compensated similar to Judge Finesilver’s panel, discussed infra, at $1,500 per case.
In comparison, fees for experts and other litigation costs under the current system can run up to over $10,000 per case, infra
note 173.
173Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 361 (2001).
38that power only to the special master, whose favorable past experience with particular experts may lead
to systemic biases. The legitimacy of the appointment of the panel of experts would be maintained by
having both parties have some control over the composition of the panel, including making the sources of
possible candidates known.174 “Such participation should give the parties conﬁdence in both the expertise
and neutrality of the candidate and enhance the legitimacy of the appointment.”175
Using court-appointed experts would also maximize institutional competencies between scientists and special
masters. According to one survey, most of the special masters reported that they consulted medical textbooks
and other medical literature to learn more about the speciﬁc issues in their cases. “All indicated that they
sometimes consult information not presented by the parties to resolve questionable or conﬂicting scientiﬁc
or medical testimony.”176 However, this role may be more appropriate for a neutral panel of experts, rather
than having the special master, who is most likely an attorney not trained in science or medicine, to resolve
conﬂicting scientiﬁc or medical evidence.
According to Dr. Marcia Angell, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, “scientiﬁc conclusions
cannot be based on argument and opinion. There must be data. Yet, in the courtroom, acceptance of expert
testimony on scientiﬁc questions usually turns on the ’credibility’ of the witness, not the validity of the evi-
dence on which the witness’s opinion is based.”177 When presented with conﬂicting, diametrically opposed
opinions, special masters may resort to subjective factors unrelated to the scientiﬁc probability of whether
or not the vaccine caused the plaintiﬀ’s injury, such as the expert’s demeanor, personality, or reputation
174See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientiﬁc Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 Emory L.J. 927 (1994).
175Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science Panels: Two
Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation 96 (2001).
176Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Case-Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 33 (1998). This
practice has been upheld by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims on appeal in Hines v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
21 Cl. Ct. 634 (1990). Id.
177Joseph M. Price and Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the Courtroom: Causes, Eﬀects and Controls, 19 Hamline
L.R. 395, 398 (1996), quoting Marcia Angell, Do Breast Implants Cause Systemic Disease? Science in the Courtroom, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1748, 1748 (1994).
39as a professional witness. Appointing a neutral panel increases the fairness, aﬀords the parties a sort of
“intellectual due process,” 178 and reduces the arbitrariness of opinions and outcomes.
The current system of experts testifying on the respective parties’ behalf creates perverse incentives for
lawyers. Expert witnesses are often referred to as “saxophones,” trained to project the “tune” composed
by the lawyer.179 “The more measured and impartial an expert is, the less likely he is to be used by either
side.”180 Cross-examination is designed to attack the expert’s credibility; his reputation as a professional
witness; intellectual biases; and possible conﬂicts of interest with the vaccine in question, rather than the
truthfulness of his assertions. “Short of forbidding the use of experts altogether, we probably could not have
designed a procedure better suited to minimize the inﬂuence of expertise.”181 Since only contested issues of
causation are presumably adjudicated, the present system of dueling experts “‘is a practical closing of the
doors of justice upon the use of specialized and scientiﬁc knowledge.’ ...[W]hen the conﬂict between the
experts is direct and open, ‘the absurdity of our present system is apparent.”’182
For example, the child’s own pediatrician often testiﬁes as the plaintiﬀs’ expert.183 As physicians, they most
likely testify more as advocates for the child rather than neutral experts, since physicians are trained to
act only in the patient’s best interests and would not have otherwise been hired in the ﬁrst instance if they
were not willing to testify accordingly. They may get “caught up in the adversary system ...and push their
conclusions to the very edge of acceptable scientiﬁc practice, or even beyond.”184 Intellectual biases among
the experts would presumably be balanced on the panel so that the special master will receive a spectrum
178Scott Brewer, Scientiﬁc Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L.J., 1535 (1998).
179Eric D. Green, et al. Problems, Cases, and Material on Evidence 927 (2000).
180Id. at 930.
181Id.
182W. Kip Viscusi, et al., The Eﬀect of Products Liability Litigation on Innovation: Deterring Ineﬃcient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437, 1473 n.130
(1994).
183According to one survey, 73 percent of plaintiﬀs’ attorneys used their clients’ treating physicians as experts in entitlement
hearings. See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized
Decision Makers, and Case-Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 31
(1998).
184Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium: Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 791, 826 (1994).
40of opinions, rather than each party’s expert zealously advocating for their respective viewpoints.
Appointing a neutral panel of experts may also facilitate settlement, as parties are often reluctant to come
to an agreement because of divergent expectations of the strengths of their cases. “In complex scientiﬁc
and technical cases, disparity in the parties’ estimates of the plaintiﬀ’s probability of success are usually
caused by sincere and strongly held divergent views on how a crucial technical issue will be decided.... Unless
some additional information causes the parties to reevaluate their experts’ conﬁdence in their opinions or
the parties’ conﬁdence in their experts’ opinions, the disparity between the estimates of success will prevent
settlement.”185
Court-appointed experts may also encourage special masters to give more appropriate weight to expert
testimony in general. According to one special master, he tends to discount repeat experts’ testimonies
because some repeat experts are “‘not willing to ﬁnd an encephalopathy if it hits them in the face.”’186
When approximately 50 percent of plaintiﬀs’ attorneys use experts who have testiﬁed previously for them
in a vaccine program case,187 special masters are not strongly considering the plaintiﬀs’ expert testimonies
in a signiﬁcant number of cases. On the other hand, court-appointed experts may also gain an “aura of
infallibility,” a concern the Advisory Committee had when enacting Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Federal
Evidence.188 Consequently, special masters may rely too heavily on the panel’s recommendations and like
the current system, put too much emphasis on the scientiﬁc evidence as an outcome-determinative factor.
However, unlike federal courts, the NVICP would be using a panel of three experts, rather than a single
expert, which would reﬂect diﬀering opinions and minimize this concern, since the panel’s main goals are to
elucidate conﬂicting scientiﬁc evidence and generate a recommendation in light of the medical uncertainty.
185Eric D. Green, et al. Problems, Cases, and Material on Evidence 927 (2000).
186Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 39 (1998).
187See id. at 31.
188Fed. R. Evid. 706 Advisory Committee’s Note. Rule 706 gives federal courts the authority to appoint experts by its own
selection or by agreement by the parties. However, it also retains the “dueling expert system” by permitting each party to call
its own expert witnesses. See Fed. R. Evid. 706(d). Rule 706 was modeled after Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
41“The court’s expert can function very much like the author of an academic review by outlining and evalu-
ating management recommendations.”189 This will emphasize the medical uncertainty concerning causation
and remind special masters that they will need to consider more than just the scientiﬁc evidence in making
their decisions.
Another possible downside to this proposed system may be that the panel selected represents more main-
stream views, since presumably the more extreme positions would be eliminated by the attorneys’ peremptory
challenges. Although this may lead to more predictable and less arbitrary decisions, it might also exclude
cutting-edge scientiﬁc theories from the special master’s consideration. Requiring special masters to stay
abreast new developments or trusting professional societies to recommend experts in the ﬁeld doing cutting-
edge research may help minimize this risk.
Even though special masters have congressional authority to use court-appointed experts, special masters
rarely use them.
[T]he masters may, in some cases, be well-advised to retain independent medical experts to
assist in the evaluation of medical issues associated with eligibility for compensation and the
amounts of compensation to be awarded. In cases where petitioners assert a theory of vaccine
causation of injury and respondents claim other causation, the master may ﬁnd it most
expeditious to receive outside advice rather than attempt a full adversarial proceeding on
the question of causation. The Act authorizes such action by the master and the Conferees
would encourage its use as appropriate.190
This is consistent with the language in the Act, stating that special masters “may require the testimony
of any person and the production of any documents as may be reasonable and necessary.”191 However,
even the Oﬃce of Special Master’s Guidelines for Practice Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program emphasize that special masters may hire or suggest the hiring of their own expert witnesses or
189Derry Ridgway, Innocent of Empirical Rigor, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 165, 230 (2001).
19142 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(iii).
42neutral medical expert in “unusual” instances. “In general, however, the parties are responsible for the
traditional tasks of identifying and developing information supporting or opposing an award, securing and
presenting fact witnesses and expert testimony, and meeting their respective burdens of proof.”192 A similar
pattern is seen in judges in civil and criminal courts, who are also given similar authority in respective
statutes.193
One reason judges cite as to why court-appointed experts are not used in the trial context is to preserve
the adversarial nature of the proceedings with minimal judicial intervention. However, in the vaccine injury
cases, the special masters are extensively involved from the start, holding pretrial meetings to discuss what
sorts of documents should be provided; their initial thoughts about the case; and what further evidence each
party needs to show. In this respect, the special masters take on a comparable role to the judges in Europe
who are seen as part and parcel of the investigatory process. In addition, the NVICP is designed to minimize
the adversarial nature of the proceedings; it was not intended to be yet another litigious trial. Therefore,
the NVICP may be an ideal setting to use such experts.
Court-appointed experts have been used in cases where causation of vaccine injuries is to be determined.
During what Congress perceived to be a swine ﬂu epidemic in the 1970’s, Congress passed the National
Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 (the “Swine Flu Act”),194 insulating insurance companies and
vaccine manufacturers from liability and establishing the Federal Treasury as the insurer for adverse eﬀects
of the vaccine. The Swine Flu Act was eventually repealed in 1978, although claims continued to be litigated
192Office of Special Masters, United States Court of Federal Claims, Guidelines for Practice Under the Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 8 (2002).
193See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 53(b) and (c), which states that court-appointed masters may be appropriate to report on
“particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence” when the issues are “complicated” or
upon “a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.”
194See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens and Leavy Mathews III, Federalism and Federal Liability Reform: The United
States Constitution Supports Reform, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 269 (1999).
43through 1990.195 Of the forty-ﬁve million inoculated, 4,169 ﬁled claims for damages were ﬁled against the
government by 1986 for injuries caused by the vaccine.196 Cash settlements were sixty times the original
estimates ($86.3 million) and forty-one lawsuits were still pending ten years after the program’s inception.197
Court-appointed experts were used in one of these cases involving ten plaintiﬀs. In re Swine Flu Immu-
nization Products Liability Litigation,198 Judge Sherman G. Finesilver (D. Col., sitting on the case by
designation) appointed a panel of three medical experts (two neurologists and one medical statistician and
epidemiologist) under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Due to the technical complexity of certain issues involved in this litigation, the Court ﬁnds
that the appointment of a Panel of Medical Experts will meaningfully assist in their res-
olution. We further ﬁnd that the medical ﬁndings and conclusions of said Panel may sig-
niﬁcantly enhance settlement negotiations between the litigants and potentially lead to
resolution of these cases without necessity of trial.199
The panel itself then appointed a Chairperson and two members who would conduct physical examinations
on the plaintiﬀ to determine whether the swine ﬂu vaccine caused the plaintiﬀ’s injury. Judge Finesilver
delineated the panel’s “areas of inquiry” as: “(1) the nature and extent of the injuries suﬀered by plaintiﬀ;
(2) the causal connection, if any, between the injuries and the immunization; (3) the prognosis of plaintiﬀ’s
condition and prospects for rehabilitation; and (4) the nature and extent of treatment which plaintiﬀ will
be required to undergo.”200 Where the panel determined that the plaintiﬀ’s injury was not Guillain-Barre
Syndrome (the condition associated with the swine ﬂue vaccine), the panel would also address: “(5) what
was known in the medical community prior to October 1976 about the causal relation between inﬂuenza
immunization and the injury plaintiﬀ contracted.”201 After examining the plaintiﬀ and all of the relevant
195See Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384
(1993).
196John P. Wilson. The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manufacture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34
Santa Clara L. Rev. 495, 506 (1994).
197Id.
198495 F. Supp. 1185 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
200Id.
201Id.
44medical records and documents, the panel submitted a single report of its ﬁndings on the above areas of
inquiry, along with any dissenting reports to the court and respective parties by the court’s set deadline.
After submitting the report, each party had 10 days to request the deposition of any panel member, as
well as examine and cross-examine any panel member at trial. The party requesting the panel member’s
deposition and trial testimony was responsible for the additional cost (otherwise, each panel member was
paid $1,500 per case).202
In mass torts litigation regarding silicone breast implants, Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (N.D. Ala.),203
designated to handle pretrial proceedings in a multi-district litigation, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Products Liability Litigation, MDL-926,204 appointed a selection panel (consisting of an evidence professor
and several scientists)205 to screen individuals who would serve on the National Science Panel (under Rule
706), charged with the following written instructions:
(a)
Issues. To what extent, if any, and with what limitations and
caveats do existing studies, research, and reported observations provide a reliable and
reasonable scientiﬁc basis for one to conclude that silicone-gel breast implants cause or
exacerbate any of the conditions described in (b) below? If, in the process of making
these ﬁndings, you believe that there are related or subordinate issues that should be
separately addressed, please do so.
(b) Scope. You are asked at this time to consider the relationship, if any, between implants and the
following:
202Id. at 1187.
203Judge Pointer’s decision to use court-appointed experts seemed to be inspired by Judge Weinstein’s use of Rule 706 panels
of experts in silicone breast implant cases before him in the Eastern District of New York. His selection panel consisted of two
attorneys and one scientist, appointed as special masters under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 53, to select a science panel and consider
what the scope of their work might be. See Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Litig. § 11:9 (2002).
204793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
205See Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Litig. § 11:9 (2002).
45i) “classic” connective tissue diseases, such as systemic lupus erythematosus,
Sj¨ ogren’s syndrome, etc.
ii) “atypical” presentations of connective tissue diseases or symptoms
iii) immune system dysfunctions
(c) Contrary Opinions. To what extent, if any, should any of your opinions referenced in (a)
above be considered as subject to suﬃcient genuine dispute as would permit other persons,
generally qualiﬁed in your ﬁeld of expertise, to express opinions that, though contrary to
yours, would likely be viewed by others in the ﬁeld as representing legitimate and responsible
disagreement within your profession?206
Based on the selection panel’s recommendations, Judge Pointer ultimately appointed four experts from each
of the four relevant disciplines (toxicology, epidemiology, rheumatology, and immunology) to serve on the
National Science Panel.207 He also appointed special counsel to represent the experts’ interests, facilitate
communication among the panel members, and help familiarize them with the legal proceedings.208
The experts were asked to comment or seek clariﬁcation from the court’s instructions before commencing
with its duties; none expressed any reservations over the instructions. Judge Pointer’s panel submitted one
report, with each expert writing his own chapter, linked by a common executive summary. Each chapter
contained its own background, deﬁnitions of problems, analyses, references, and conclusions. The panel’s
report would then become part of the record of 22,000 breast implant cases that had been consolidated in
Judge Pointer’s court as part of the multi-district litigation process.209 In addition, each party was free to
call its own experts during trial.
The three-year process of selecting, instructing, deposing, and reporting by the panel members cost $1 mil-
lion,210 which was funded in part, by the federal judiciary, as well as by the respective parties. Judge Pointer
207See id. at 16.
208Experts found this cumbersome and eventually communicated directly with each other. See id.
209See id. at 82.
210See id. at 21.
46noted that having the judiciary contribute to the panel’s expense “would show the court’s commitment to
resolving diﬃcult legal–scientiﬁc questions in a manner that emphasizes truth rather than partisanship or
the parties’ resources.”211 Each of the selection panel members and the National Science Panel experts
were paid $200 per hour for their work. Fees and expenses associated with the work of the special counsel
amounted to over a million dollars.
In comparison, in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,212 Judge Robert Jones (D. Or.) selected a panel of tech-
nical advisors from a list consisting of the senior faculty in each specialty area at the Oregon Health Sciences
University and from other professional and academic colleagues. He had each technical advisor submit a
separate report, therefore requiring little communication among panel members.213 The panel’s role was
more limited than in the previous two examples. Judge Jones appointed the panel (under Rule 104(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, related to the court’s threshold in determining the admissibility of testimony)
in anticipation of disputes about scientiﬁc methodology and admissibility of testimony from the plaintiﬀs’
experts, since the condition in question was an unusual form of connective tissue disease allegedly caused
by the migration of silicone from the implants.214 The panel was designed to assist the judge in evaluating
proﬀered expert testimony, primarily that of the plaintiﬀs, and accordingly, to oﬀer advice regarding the
admissibility of scientiﬁc evidence in motion in limine proceedings.215
The eﬀects of the use of court-appointed experts in both breast implant cases are diﬃcult to assess, since
most of the claims ultimately settled. Whether this could be attributed to the use of the panel or what
the plaintiﬀs’ attorneys thought to be a long and arduous process that forced them to settle is diﬃcult to
211Id. at 82.
212947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
213See Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science Panels:
Two Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation 52
(2001).
214See Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Litig. § 11:9 (2002).
215See Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science Panels:
Two Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation 87
(2001).
47determine. The authors conducting the studies on the panels appointed by Judges Pointer and Jones stated,
The use of court-appointed experts is an extraordinary technique that is appropriate when
the evidence is especially demanding and the opportunity for reasoned and principled con-
sideration based on submissions by the parties has been exhausted or oﬀers little promise.
The diﬃculty of accommodating the conﬂicting values of science and law within such a
process is unlikely to satisfy those who insist on the deliberate and openended consideration
that is characteristic of science, or those who insist on the speedy and certain resolution of
issues that is valued by law.216
The authors recommended that future panels should appoint an administrative chair for the panel to help
organize the panel’s work, helping to facilitate coordination of the panel’s collective work and serve as a
focus of communication among panel members.
Although the panels in the silicone breast implant litigations were deemed cumbersome and expensive, the
NVICP panel of experts would not have to be burdened by the same handicaps. First, in addition to
adopting the recommendations by the authors above, Judge Pointer’s selection panel and special counsel
hired to represent the experts would be unnecessary in the NVICP, since the experts would be selected by
a voir dire process. Second, experts would need to familiarize themselves with a simpler set of procedural
and evidentiary rules in the NVICP proceedings, in comparison to a complicated multi-district litigation
consolidating roughly 22,000 cases. Third, it would be unnecessary to depose each of the experts, as Judge
Pointer did, since their report and recommendations would be part of the record, and their testimonies during
the proceedings would be subject to questioning by both parties’ attorneys and the special master. Finally,
because experts would presumably work on a number of claims by virtue of random selection, they would
gain an increasing familiarity with the Table and other vaccine-related injuries. In addition, their repeated
experiences may even help establish new links between vaccines and injuries that can then be added to the
48Table to expand (or restrict, if necessary) coverage under the program.
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Improvement
Act of 2003
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Improvement Act of 2003 (the “Improvement Act”)
proposes a few changes to improve many aspects of the NVICP.217 First, it would increase the current statute
of limitations from three to six years from the date of injury. “A relatively generous limitation period is
warranted by possible medical uncertainty as to the cause of the death or injury.”218 In addition, information
about the program is not widely disseminated, and parents may not even be aware of the program without
proactively initiating their own research. Although the Improvement Act does not include provisions for
equitable tolling for extenuating circumstances, special masters should be given more discretion to hear
claims that may fall outside the statute of limitations (whether it be three or six years), especially when
there are medical uncertainties of causation present at the time of vaccination.
The following example demonstrates the need for an extended statute of limitations period. One special
master rationalized her decision to deny compensation by reasoning that “under an objective standard a
reasonable parent would have inquired into her legal rights ...after seeing such drastic changes in her son’s
217In addition to the provisions discussed infra, the Improvement Act also provides for a one-time, two-year period for families
with post-1988 injuries to ﬁle claims if they were previously excluded from ﬁling due to the statute of limitations; increases
compensation for future lost earnings, using the Bureau of Labor statistics on the average weekly earnings of full-time workers
only (current law includes part-time wages as well); allows for recovery of family counseling costs; and creates and maintains
guardianship for the fund. See Congressman Dan Burton, A Commitment to the Vaccine Injured is Kept: Burton to Introduce
“Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Improvement Act of 2003,” at http://www.house.gov/burton/pr31803.htm.
218Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 39 (2000).
49condition.”219 In that case, the child’s “parents made a good faith eﬀort and exercised due diligence in
attempting to discover the causes of Alex’s injuries. Why would Alex’s parents [have] thought to pursue
legal remedies if they did not even have evidence to prove a causal relationship between his injuries and the
vaccination?”220 If every parent followed the duty as stated by the special master, only absurd results would
come, since parents would be encouraged to call their attorneys and think about litigation during a time
when they are focusing on trying to make their children healthier.
Second, the Improvement Act would increase the $250,000 cap on death beneﬁts to $300,000. The $250,000
cap on damages has been widely used in tort damages, including medical malpractice, for over twenty years.
“‘The endurance of the $250,000 ﬁgure is especially remarkable given that little thought seems to have gone
into devising it in the ﬁrst place.”’221 According to one commentator, the ﬁgure was adopted in California at
a time when awards rarely exceeded the cap.222 For the NVICP, the ﬁgure has not been adjusted since the
program’s inception in 1986, in light of inﬂation, rapidly increasing medical care costs, and a higher median
pain and suﬀering awards.223
Finally, the Improvement Act would modify the schedule of payment of attorneys’ fees. The NVICP provides
for reasonable attorneys’ fees, whether or not the plaintiﬀ’s claim is successful, if the claim was brought in
good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim. However, the special masters have discretion to
reduce the fees if they ﬁnd them unreasonable, and attorneys must wait until a ﬁnal judgment is rendered—a
requirement that sometimes may take years to obtain. Because of the current system’s long and uncertain
219Leonard D. Pertnoy, A Child’s View of Recovery Under the National Childhood Vaccine Act or “He Who Hesitates is
Lost,” 59 Montana L. Rev. 275, 284 (1998), citing Pertnoy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, No. 95-218V, 1995
WL 579827, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
220Id.
221Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t That the Tort Lawyers are so Right, It’s Just that the Tort Reformers are so Wrong, 49 Rutgers
L. Rev. 485, 539 (1997).
222Id.
223The median pain and suﬀering award in malpractice cases is now about $300,000. Id.
50fee schedule, an increasing number of attorneys are reluctant to accept vaccine cases altogether. One of the
proposed amendments in the Improvement Act makes attorneys’ fees available during the interim so that
attorneys can recover costs while adjudicating their client’s claims. This would be similar to experts who
can currently recover their expenses within 30 days of rendering their services.
The Need for Additional Research: The Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System
The NVICA also requires the Secretary to promote the development of vaccines with fewer adverse eﬀects
and improve the “licensing, manufacturing, processing, testing, labeling, warning, use instructions, dis-
tribution, storage, administration, ﬁeld surveillance, adverse reaction reporting, and recall of reactogenic
lots or batches, of vaccines, and research on vaccines, in order to reduce the risks of adverse reactions to
vaccines.”224 In addition, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-25(b)(1) requires health care providers and vaccine manu-
facturers to report adverse events to the Secretary. To help facilitate this, the joint administration of the
FDA and CDC established the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (“VAERS”) in 1990, accepting
reports from health professionals, vaccine manufacturers, and the public.225 “The objectives of VAERS are
to 1) detect new, unusual, or rare vaccine adverse events; 2) monitor increases in known adverse events; 3)
determine patient risk factors for particular types of adverse events; 4) identify vaccine lots with increased
numbers or types of reported adverse events; and 5) assess the safety of newly licensed vaccines.”226
The success of VAERS has been modest at best. The FDA estimates that only ten percent of doctors report
such adverse reactions.227 Vaccine manufacturers ﬁle the most reports (36.2 percent), followed by state and
local health departments (27.6 percent), health-care providers (20.0 percent), and patients and parents (4.2
227The CDC estimates that from 1991-2001, 11.4 reports were made per 100,000 net doses distributed for the 27 frequently
reported vaccine types. Id. at 1 (Jan. 24, 2003).
51percent). However, there was a steady increase in the reporting by health-care providers over time, from
11.4 percent in 1991 to 35.3 percent in 2001.228 The VAERS working group made a conscientious eﬀort to
improve the reporting by health-care professionals, including increased education through directed mailing,
continuing medical education, and publication of analyses of VAERS data in various medical journals.229
This increase could have also partly been attributed to new vaccines added in the mid- to late 1990’s, in-
cluding the rotavirus vaccine that has since been shown to cause intussuception in a signiﬁcant number of
infants inoculated with the vaccine.
Unfortunately, the HHS “essentially disregards the system’s [VAERS] importance as an indicator of potential
vaccine safety concerns,” attributing such reports as merely “anecdotal.”230 VAERS receives approximately
10,000 reports per year regarding more than 100 million vaccinations administered to children in the United
States. Of all the complaints, approximately 14.2 percent describe serious events, deﬁned as an event result-
ing in death, life-threatening illness, hospitalization, prolongation of existing hospitalization, or permanent
disability.231 The CDC and FDA follow up with any serious report and request additional information,
including medical records and autopsy reports, to complete the description of the case.232 Letters requesting
recovery status of persons suﬀering from serious adverse reactions are also sent to the reporters 60 days
and 1 year after vaccination.233 Furthermore, a clinical research team follows up with all VAERS reports
of death, most of which have been classiﬁed as sudden infant death syndrome (“SIDS”). Epidemiological
studies have consistently failed to ﬁnd a causal connection between vaccines and SIDS. However, a causal
link may be diﬃcult to establish since a control group of unvaccinated children is virtually impossible to ﬁnd,
228Id.
229Id. at 4.
230Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. Pharmacy &
Law 249, 268 (1995).
231Susan S. Ellenberg and Robert T. Chen, The Complicated Task of Monitoring Vaccine Safety, 112 Pub. Health Rep. 10
(1997), available at 1997 WL 9736160.
232See Center for Disease Control, Surveillance for Safety After Immunization: the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
(VAERS) – United States, 1991-2001, 52 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 1, 2 (Jan. 24, 2003).
233Id.
52and of those who are unvaccinated, they often suﬀer from other problems such as a lower baseline health
and socioeconomic status that are diﬃcult to control for and isolate.
“The lack of enforcement provisions or even any monitoring of reporting practices precludes any assumptions
about the extent to which such events are in fact reported.”234 Because of underreporting, reporting of
temporal associations or unconﬁrmed diagnoses (overreporting), lack of control comparison groups, and
diﬀerential reporting (VAERS is more likely to receive reports of serious events and those with shorter onset
times after vaccination), determining causal connections between the vaccines and the adverse events requires
further epidemiological or other laboratory studies.235 Of more than 1.9 billion doses of vaccines given over
an eleven-year period (1991-2001), VAERS only received 128,717 reports of adverse events.236
However, VAERS is still an important tool to illuminate early signals and possible causal connections that can
then be further investigated. Because of the limitations inherent in clinical trials, including a relatively small
number of subjects and limited testing period, post-marketing monitoring of adverse events is imperative.
VAERS can rapidly identify problems associated with newly licensed vaccines not detected by clinical trials
conducted before FDA approval,237 facilitate lot-speciﬁc safety evaluations and initiate recalls if necessary,
and reassure the public of the safety of vaccines not associated with signiﬁcant adverse events. VAERS is
the “front line” of vaccine safety surveillance238 and must be supplemented by further studies and additional
research.




237VAERS helped to ﬂag the potential causal link between rotavirus vaccines and intussuception for further investigation,
leading to the eventual removal of the vaccine from the market.
238Susan S. Ellenberg and Robert T. Chen, The Complicated Task of Monitoring Vaccine Safety, 112 Pub. Health Rep. 10
(1997), available at 1997 WL 9736160.
53contains information on more than seven million people enrolled in eight health maintenance organizations
through the United States. “The strengths of VSD include the documentation of immunizations, the absence
of underreporting bias of medical outcomes, and the inclusion in the database of a high number of vaccinated
persons who did not have adverse events.”239 Although VSD does not contain information representative of
the population across socioeconomic status, health care setting, and race dimensions, the VSD does permit
epidemiological vaccine safety studies to be conducted and new hypotheses tested.
In addition, the CDC established a national network of Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment (“CISA”)
Centers that develop and disseminate standardized clinical evaluation protocols to clinicians, and consult
and advise health-care providers on the management of patients with adverse reactions and the advisability
of continued vaccinations. “The objectives of CISA are to enhance understanding of known serious or
unusual vaccine reactions, including the pathophysiology and risk factors for such reactions, as well as to
evaluate newly hypothesized syndromes or events identiﬁed from the assessment of VAERS data to clarify
any potential relation between the reported adverse events and immunization.”240
In addition to building new databases of information, improving the reporting rate by health care providers
may be one of the most important objectives of the various surveillance systems. However, a sanction
enforcing the statute requiring health care professionals to report adverse events may be a “blunt instrument
of public policy in this arena. If there is a problem, it is likely to be a systemic and attitudinal one rather than
one that might be neatly and fully resolved by a statutory directive.”241 Perhaps the eﬀorts by the VAERS
working group in increasing awareness of the importance of the program to health care professionals can help
further this goal. In addition, as computer technology makes it possible to put medical records online and
239See Center for Disease Control, Surveillance for Safety After Immunization: the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
(VAERS) – United States, 1991-2001, 52 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 1, 8 (Jan. 24, 2003).
240Id.
241Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 43 (2000).
54to create vast databases of medical information, adverse events from vaccinations and patient characteristics
will naturally be recorded by health care professionals, thus, providing a rich source of invaluable information
for vaccine research and development.242
Comparisons With Other Vaccine Compensation Programs
Surprisingly, many countries with universal health coverage and generous social assistance programs have
also implemented separate vaccine injury compensation programs as supplementary sources of compensa-
tion. Similarly, the United States’ NVICP is designed to be supplementary, placing the burden of proof on
plaintiﬀs to show that their expenses will not be compensated by any “other federal or state health programs
(excluding Title XIX of the Social Security Act), private or prepaid health services, insurance policies, or
state compensation programs.”243
For example, in determining whether residential placement of the injured child is medical or educational in
nature, the special masters determine the source of compensation. The Act covers medical placements only,
explicitly prohibiting recovery for punitive or exemplary damages244 or for any other compensation not for
the health, education, or welfare of the injured person.245 Therefore, those who need residential placement
for “behavioral problems, aggressiveness, potential for self-harm or management problems,” even if their
condition is caused by a vaccine-related injury, need to be relieved through another state compensation
program such as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).246 Under the NVICP, “there
242Presumably, patient privacy (under informed consent and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA,
regulations) would be suﬃciently protected before research entities could use such information.
243Susan G. Clark, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 94 Ed. Law Rep. 671, 679 (1994).
244See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(d)(1).
245See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(d)(2).
246IDEA enables children who need special education and related services due to disability to receive a free public education
designed to meet their unique learning needs. See Susan G. Clark, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 94
Ed. Law Rep. 671, 680 (1994).
55is no mandate to maximize potential or provide the best program available, ...or to optimize an injured
person’s quality of life. Awards under the compensation program are then secondary to relief available under
a state compensation program,”247 and not co-extensive with entitlement.248 Consequently, the Act imposes
a $250,000 cap on compensation for pain, suﬀering, and emotional distress,249 as well as a ﬁxed award of
$250,000 in cases of death.250 Compensation for vaccine-related injuries before October 1, 1988 are much
less generous, capping damages at $30,000 for lost earnings, pain and suﬀering, and reasonable attorneys’
fees.251
Even though the NVICP is supplementary, the monetary awards are generally higher in the United States
than in other countries. The average post-1988 case award in the United States for FY 2003 was $1,427,169
(out of 40 cases),252 compared to Quebec’s average recovery per person of $135,000253 and the United
Kingdom’s lump sum of £40,000254 (approximately $63,000) paid to each successful applicant, without
individual assessments of actual losses. These discrepancies are most likely due to the fact that most other
countries provide some form of universal health care coverage that pays for medical expenses that the fund
in the United States needs to separately account for. Compensating victims is “an especially acute problem
in a nation with such a porous social safety net. ...[W]e need a better system ...so as to be able to say
that tort law isn’t really needed to provide for accident victims’ medical care.”255
247Id. at 682.
248See Sir Geoﬀrey Palmer, The Ninth Monsanto Lecture: The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, O.K.?
29 Val. U.L. Rev. 1115 (1995) (discussing New Zealand’s vaccine compensation and tort systems).
249See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
250See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
251See 42 U.S.C.A. §300aa-15(b)(1)-(3).
252Heath Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Monthly Statistics Report (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/monthly.htm.
253See Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 21 (2000).
254See id. at 28. On June 27, 2000, the British government announced that it intended to introduce legislation increasing the
lump sum payment from £40,000 to £100,000, dropping the six-year statute of limitations , permitting anyone up to the age of
21 to ask for compensation, and reducing the severity of disability from 80 to 60 percent. Id. at 29.
255See Stephen D. Sugarman, Beyond Compensation: Proposals for Reform, 15 Hawaii L. Rev. 659, 664-665 (1993).
56Although there are many similarities among the diﬀerent compensation programs, including their supple-
mentary nature, the vaccines and injuries covered, the option for plaintiﬀs to pursue tort remedies, and the
gaps in disability compensation under existing forms of social assistance making such programs necessary,256
the percentage of claims compensated and the total number of claims ﬁled are diﬃcult to compare. For
example, the data shown below reﬂect a median percentage of 32.2 percent of claims compensated (New
Zealand). The United States compensates roughly 30 percent of claims ﬁled,257 and is therefore on par with
other countries. However, “there is great variability across programs with respect to both the total number
of claims ﬁled and number of claims compensated. Accordingly, it is diﬃcult to make valid comparisons
in view of the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in legislative language, the political and legal climate, and individual
program longevity, process and decision-making. This is particularly true for the numbers of claims that are
compensated.”258
In addition, the data also show that a smaller number of claims are ﬁled in most other countries as compared
with the United States. This may be due to broader social assistance programs provided by other countries
that their respective populations regard as suﬃcient to cover most of their expenses.259 However, the total
number of claims ﬁled is also diﬃcult to compare among the diﬀerent programs, as it may depend on
“population size, the numbers of vaccines administered, kinds of injuries covered, the willingness of the
public to seek compensation under the governmental program versus other sources of compensation,” and
256See Wendy K Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-related Injury Abroad: A Comparative Analysis, 31 St. Louis
U.L.J. 599, 633 (1987).
257This statistic is a rough approximation of percentage of claims compensation, since it includes pre- and post-1988 cases, up
to claims ﬁled as of June 1999. See Geoﬀrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, Vaccine 17 S25, S26
(1999).
258Id. at S29-S30.
259See Wendy K Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-related Injury Abroad: A Comparative Analysis, 31 St. Louis
U.L.J. 599, 654 (1987).
57public awareness of the program’s existence.260
260Geoﬀrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, Vaccine 17 S25, S30 (1999).
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Although the numerical data are diﬃcult to compare, the United States can still learn from and incorporate
features of the other countries’ compensation programs. Two especially unique programs, Sweden and New
Zealand, are discussed in more detail below.
Sweden
261See id. at S26.
262Japan initially set up a program in 1970 but implemented a more comprehensive program in 1977 that is currently in place.
See id. at S27.
263Similarly, Denmark set up its program in 1972 but implemented its current program in 1978. See id.
59The Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance program greatly simpliﬁes the claim process, requiring that the pa-
tient’s physician, rather than attorney, help the patient’s family ﬁle a claim. The claim and relevant medical
records are then submitted to the insurer and reviewed initially by the insurer’s medical assessor and then
by physicians employed as advisors. They use a “preponderant probability” standard to determine causa-
tion, relying on a statistical causal relationship, where a chronological connection can be given substantial
weight.264 Assessors also consider factors other than causation in determining compensation eligibility, in-
cluding the nature and severity of the treated disease, general health of patient, severity of reaction, and
foreseeability of the reaction. Any subsequent disputes are referred to the Drug Injury Committee, which
then issues a statement on its ﬁndings whether or not the claim deserves compensation. If the family still
disputes the committee’s ﬁndings, arbitrators make ﬁnal determinations in accordance with the Swedish
Arbitration Act.265
To be compensated under Sweden’s program, the plaintiﬀ must be seriously disabled measured by bodily
injury and/or time away from work.266 In 1986, maximum recovery was $69,500 with an average indem-
niﬁcation of $12,000.267 Although these awards may seem minimal by our standards (the overall pre-1988
injury award averages $843,137),268 Sweden’s program is only one of a diﬀuse network of medical insurance
plans that already cover many of its citizens’ medical expenses. One commentator observes that “70 percent
of all beneﬁts under the Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance are used to compensate pain and suﬀering and
that lost wages, medical treatment, and nursing care are covered by other national programs.”269
264See Carl Oldertz, Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden, 34 Am. J. Comp. L.
635, 648 (1986).
265See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199, 228 (1992).
266Id. at 229 n.196.
267Id. at 228.
268Heath Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Monthly Statistics Report (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/monthly.htm.
269Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199, 228 n.193 (1992).
60This seems to reﬂect the primary goals of Sweden’s program—compensation and spreading losses, wealth
redistribution, and reduction of administrative costs. As Calabresi points out, “the basic deterrence/safety
decision is achieved in Sweden through regulation, and the insurance plans work only to induce the extra
or marginal safety that pain and suﬀering-type costs may make appropriate.”270 As a result, Sweden’s
compensation system results in decisions that take on “a measure of uniformity over time and provide both
manufacturers and consumers with a degree of certainty of rights and responsibilities that is not possible at
common law.”271
New Zealand
New Zealand’s legislature was strongly motivated by the ineﬃciencies of its own tort system when enacting
its vaccine compensation program. The common law tort system cost about forty cents in transaction costs
to deliver sixty cents in beneﬁts.272 This is in stark contrast to its compensation program, which costs about
seven cents to deliver a dollar of beneﬁts.273 Like Sweden, physicians help injured parties ﬁle claims which are
then sent to the Accident Compensation Corporation Registration Centre (the “Corporation”). All medical
claims, including vaccine injury claims, are forwarded to the Medical Misadventure, whose clinical advisors
investigate the claims and secure medical and consultants’ expert reports. An independent medical advisor
then assesses the claim and makes his recommendations to the Medical Misadventure Advisory Committee
(the “Committee”) who then makes its preliminary recommendation to the Corporation. The petitioner
270Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 Am. J. Comp. Law 657, 665 (1986).
271Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 199, 229 (1992).
272See Sir Geoﬀrey Palmer, The Ninth Monsanto Lecture: The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, O.K.?
29 Val. U.L. Rev. 1115,1120 (1995).
273See id. at 1167.
61and the Corporation have 15 days to comment on this recommendation; the Committee then gives its ﬁnal
advice to the Corporation.274 The petitioners may request an appeal by an independent Review Oﬃcer and
then the District Court, but can only appeal to the High Court on matters of law only.275
Although examining the compensation programs from other countries may be instructive, what is eﬃcient
and eﬀective depends on “what is likely to work within a given economy and political system.”276 Calabresi
notes that within the United States, “any accident compensation fund that sought to tax injurer and victim
activities according to their accident propensity would quickly be corrupted by political pressures.”277 How-
ever, the United States can adopt some of the other countries’ practices to streamline its own program, such
as using a panel of neutral experts and considering factors other than scientiﬁc causation when assessing
claims (as previously discussed), and having physicians, rather than attorneys, help patients ﬁle the initial
claim to the PHS.
Implications for Other Areas of Medicine and the Law
One commentator argues that “there are probably very few other areas in which the government will have in-
centive to assume liability for harm caused by a manufactured product in order to prevent the manufacturers
from ceasing production.”278 However, even though the entire program may not be completely transferable
to other areas of tort litigation, components of the NVICP may nevertheless be helpful. Such innovations
include the pre-trial status conference, using specialized decision makers to hear cases rather than lay juries,
relaxing the rules of discovery and evidence, a statutory cap on damages, and the use of a table to deﬁne
274See Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Compensation of Vaccine-Damaged Children 31 (2000).
275Id. at 32.
276Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 Am. J. Comp. Law 657, 659 (1986).
277Id. at 662.
278Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 53 (1998).
62injures.
AIDS Vaccines
Because of the AIDS epidemic occurring worldwide, many patient advocates call for an expedited review
process for an AIDS vaccine to not only encourage manufacturers to develop one, but also to prevent the
infection of more potential AIDS victims. However, with an expedited review process and the devastating
consequence of acquiring AIDS from an inoculation, vaccine manufacturers are understandably concerned
about potential tort liability. California’s AIDS Vaccine Program, very similar to the NVICP, would help
alleviate some of those concerns (assuming that vaccine-related injuries can be well-deﬁned) and hopefully
facilitate and expedite the development of an eﬀective and safe AIDS vaccine.279
Transfusion-Related HIV Infection
Another proposed area of compensation that the NVICP could serve as a model for is transfusion-related
HIV infection, where the federal government would place a wholesale-level excise tax on all blood and blood
products.280 However, this area is somewhat problematic to use an administrative no-fault compensation
279California had enacted a vaccine compensation program in 1977, similar to the NVICP, before the federal program was
enacted, in its Cal. Health and Safety Code § 429.35-36 (1977). In light of the NVICP’s enactment, California oﬃcially
repealed its compensation program in 1995. See Wendy K Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-related Injury Abroad:
A Comparative Analysis, 31 St. Louis U.L.J. 599 (1987).
280See Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV Infection, 60 Def. Couns. J. 384
(1993).
63scheme, since the nature of AIDS transmission raises serious issues of proving causation, including a long
latency period and alternate modes of transmission through sexual intercourse and intravenous drug use.281
Neurologically Impaired Infants
In 1987, a crisis of liability insurance availability and medical malpractice insurance aﬀordability prompted
the Virginia legislature to enact the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the “Virginia
Act”), which provides no-fault compensation for families whose infants suﬀered birth-related trauma resulting
in serious neurological impairments, expressly excluding those caused by genetic or congenital defects.282
This was seen as a preliminary step towards addressing the medical malpractice insurance crisis facing
obstetricians and the medical profession in general. The program is primarily funded by physicians, hospitals,
and non-participating physicians licensed to practice within the state of Virginia.283 If the fund becomes
insolvent, then each insurance carrier is required to contribute an amount proportional to its share of total
net premiums within Virginia to maintain the fund on an “actuarially sound basis.”284
The Virginia Act authorizes its Industrial Commission, responsible for adjudicating workers’ compensation
claims, to determine compensation eligibility, with the aid of the Medical Advisory Panel, consisting of three
physicians who ﬁle a report and recommendation of its ﬁndings of causation. Although the Commission is
not bound by the Panel’s recommendations and makes the ultimate determination, it is more than likely
281Id.
282See David G. Duﬀ, Compensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 Harv. J. on
Legis. 391 (1990).
283Each participating physician is required to pay $5,000 per year; each hospital is required to pay $50 per delivery, not to
exceed $150,000 in a twelve-month period; and $250 from each non-participating physician licensed to practice. The deﬁnition
of “participating” physicians and hospitals is deﬁned in the statute. See id. at 428.
284Id. at 429.
64that the Panel’s ﬁndings will be accorded substantial weight.285 The plaintiﬀ has the burden of proof to
show that the infant suﬀered a spinal cord or brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury
from the delivery process, rendering the infant permanently non-ambulatory, aphasic, and incontinent.286
Some commentators have criticized the program as representing “a carefully crafted exercise in special
interest legislation—promulgated in the interests of society as a whole, but conceived and orchestrated by
a small segment of the medical community and the malpractice insurance industry.”287 The Virginia Act
adopts a speciﬁc deterrence approach, since the Commission refers all claims ﬁled to the Board of Medicine
and the Department of Health—administrative agencies that handle licensing and disciplinary matters for
physicians and hospitals. However, this particular model of compensation may not be appropriate for
medical negligence, since it reintroduces “a notion of moral responsibility into a scheme that presents itself
as indiﬀerent to fault.”288
In addition to AIDS vaccines, transfusion-related HIV infections, and neurologically impaired infants injured
during the delivery process, commentators have suggested the applicability of a compensation program similar
to the NVICP to other areas of the law, including cases litigating products liability, mass torts, occupational
exposure (including military exposure to chemical agents such as Agent Orange), breast implants, asbestos,
and radiation.289 The commonality among many of these areas of the law is that aggregate injuries are
alleged, the government accepts responsibility for liability, and the causal issues lend themselves to a narrow
deﬁnition.290 Many critics of the current tort system hope that aspects of the NVICP can eventually realize
their substantial potential in other areas of the law and improve the ﬁnancial and emotional welfare of many
more injured victims in the future.
285See id.
286See id. at 423-424.
287Id. at 449.
288Id. at 439 n.321.
289See Molly Treadway Johnson, et al., Federal Judicial Center, Use of Expert Testimony, Specialized Decision
Makers, and Management Innovations in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 50 (1998).
290See id.
65Conclusion
“‘Until Americans have a comprehensive scheme of social insurance, courts must resolve by a balancing
process the head-on collision between the need for adequate recovery and viable [business] enterprises.”’291
Congress attempted to help courts do this by doing its own cost-beneﬁt analysis, weighing the immense
beneﬁts from a national vaccination program and the severe costs borne by a few who consequently suﬀer
from serious adverse events, and enacted NVICP. “But for the families living with the emotional and economic
strains of raising vaccine-injured children, or for those grieving the lost lives of young children with so much
promise, the population-based cost-beneﬁt analysis is hardly comforting.”292 However, as one commentator
stated: “It must be considered that there is nothing more diﬃcult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success,
nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all
those who proﬁt by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who proﬁt by the new order.”293
Despite the criticisms and problems, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is an innovative
alternative to tort litigation and has enjoyed many successes in compensating vaccine-injured children in its
short history. Although some critics argue that it is not that diﬀerent from the tort system it aspired to
replace, such as adversarial proceedings determining causation and long and uncertain adjudications, reforms
proposed by this paper and the Improvement Act may help alleviate some of those problems. In addition,
as the program itself matures, special masters gain more experience adjudicating claims, and the backlog
of pre-1988 cases are slowly cleared, eﬃciency will improve, leading to more expedient resolutions of claims
and more certain relief to injured parties. Although the NVICP cannot be applied to every area of tort
and personal injury law, some of the program’s most salient and innovative features will serve as important
291Clark C. Havighurst, James F. Blumstein, and Troyen A. Brennan, Health Care Law and Policy 1009 (1998).
292Elizabeth C. Scott, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351, 353 (2001).
293Sir Geoﬀrey Palmer, The Ninth Monsanto Lecture: The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, O.K.?
29 Val. U.L. Rev. 1115,1118 n.1 (1995), quoting Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, in The Prince: And, the Discourses 21
(1513).
66models for many signiﬁcant areas of tort reform.
67Appendix A: Conﬂict and Bias Screening Questionnaire (for Potential Experts)294
In re:
SILICONE GEL BREAST IMPLANT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
(MDL-926)
Silicone Breast Implant Science Panel
Potential Sources of Bias and Conﬂict of Interest Questionnaire
Instructions to Individuals Completing this Form
Before you start to complete the questionnaire please review the list of corporate defendants [omitted] and
read the “General Statement Concerning Bias and Conﬂict of Interest” and “Instructions for Completing
the Questionnaire.”
Do not skip any questions. If you require clariﬁcation of any of the items on the questionnaire, contact
Professor Alan Wolf of the Selection Panel for assistance.
When you have completed the questionnaire, sign and date the form and return it to Professor Wolf by fax
or express mail.
Promptly report to the Selection Panel any changes or additions to the information reported on this form









294Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science Panels: Two
Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation 99-104 (2001).
68General Statement Concerning Bias and Conﬂict of Interest
The Silicone Breast Implant Science Panel (hereafter, the “Science Panel”) will be charged with the respon-
sibility of evaluating and critiquing pertinent scientiﬁc literature and studies bearing on issues of disease
causation in the breast implant litigation. Since members of the Science Panel will be working directly for
the court as neutral, independent experts, it is essential that panel members be free from any conﬂict of
interest or signiﬁcant bias as well as the appearance of such conﬂict or bias. This information is needed
to ensure the integrity of the Science Panel. By screening potential members before they are selected, this
questionnaire also safeguards panelists’ professional and personal reputations by minimizing the possibility
that embarrassing conﬂict or bias issues will arise in the courtroom.
“Bias” generally refers to views stated or positions taken that are largely intellectually motivated or that
arise from the close identiﬁcation or association of an individual with a particular point of view or the
positions or perspectives of a particular group. For purposes of service on the Science Panel, the following
are examples of potentially problematic forms of bias:
1. A panel member being placed in the position of reviewing his or her own work (or that of a family
member, close friend, or colleague) for validity or scientiﬁc merit.
2. A panel member being committed to a ﬁxed position on a particular issue through public statements (e.g.,
testimony, speeches, interviews, lectures, etc.), publication (e.g., articles, books, etc.), close identiﬁcation or
association with the positions or perspectives of a particular group, or through other personal or professional
activities.
Certain forms of bias may be more properly characterized as conﬂicts of interest—e.g., where the individual
is a senior oﬃcer of a professional society that espouses a ﬁxed position on the issue.
“Conﬂict of Interest” means any ﬁnancial or other interest which conﬂicts with the service of an individual
because it could either impair the individual’s objectivity or create an unfair competitive advantage for any
person or organization. A conﬂict is likely to be present where the eﬀorts of the Science Panel may result
in a direct or indirect economic beneﬁt or loss to particular individuals or groups. Illustrative examples of
direct economic beneﬁt include:
1. A panel member (or member of his or her immediate household) has a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment or
other close tie to a corporate defendant. (Highly diversiﬁed mutual funds investing in one or more corporate
defendants do not constitute a signiﬁcant investment.)
2. A panel member has a family member or close friend who is a party to the action, or who is otherwise
involved in the litigation (e.g., a family member who is an attorney involved in the litigation).
Examples of indirect economic beneﬁt include:
1. A panel member is a junior faculty member whose department chair (or other senior faculty) has taken
a ﬁxed position regarding the merits of this litigation.
692. For purposes of critically reviewing the relevant scientiﬁc literature, a panel member requests that another
scientist furnish him or her with the raw data underlying a published work. Rather than using the data solely
for the purposes of serving the court, the panel member envisions using the data for his or her own subsequent
research eﬀorts. (In such a case the panel member should contact all relevant parties for permission to use
the data.)
The examples above are illustrative, but not all-inclusive. If you have any question as to the existence or
appearance of bias or conﬂicts, please bring these matters to the attention of the Selection Panel.
Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire
Please note that the following questions refer variously to “you,” “you or any members of your household,”
or, most broadly to “you, members of your household or members of your department.”
Any reference to an “interested party” refers to:
• plaintiﬀs and defendants in the current litigation
•
individuals or organizations that are otherwise substantially involved in the current litigation (e.g.,
law ﬁrms)
• individuals or organizations that otherwise have a stake in the outcome of the litigation (e.g.,
“educational” organizations funded primarily by a party or medical societies)
• potential litigants (e.g., close friends or relatives who have implants, and are therefore potential
plaintiﬀs).
Your responses to the following questions should be typed on additional sheets of paper, rather than on this
form.
Please provide all relevant details for any questions answered in the aﬃrmative. An aﬃrmative response to
one or more questions does not automatically disqualify you from serving on the panel. Further explanations
may, however, be requested.
If the answer to a question is contained in your curriculum vitae you may simply refer to and attach the
appropriate pages from it.
Personal interests
1. Are you or any members of your household interested parties?
2. Do you have close friends or family members who are plaintiﬀs in these actions, attorneys involved in this
litigation, or are employed by defendant corporations?
70Financial interests
3. Have you or members of your household ever worked for any interested party to the silicone breast implant
litigation? (This includes both work relating to the implant litigation and any other type of work.)
4. Have you or members of your household ever received any research funds, graduate support, or any other
funds (awards, honoraria, speaking or consulting fees, etc.) from any interested party?
5. Do you or members of your household currently have signiﬁcant investments in any of the defendant
corporations in the form of stocks, bonds, etc.? (You need not report highly diversiﬁed mutual funds or similar
investment vehicles.) Do you or members of your household currently have investments in corporations which,
although not parties to the litigation, have a stake in its outcome?
6. Have you, members of your household or members of your department conducted any research in the area
of disease causation due to silicone breast implants? Was this research funded? If so, by whom? Did this
research result in publication? If so, give citations.
7. Have you or members of your household conducted any research which was funded by corporations which,
although not parties to the silicone implant litigation, have a stake in its outcome (e.g., pharmaceutical
corporations that use silicone in medical devices)? Have you or members of your household served as
consultants to such companies on any matter?
Public statement and positions
8. Have you, members of your household, or members of your department made any public pronouncements
(e.g., to the press, to a class, or at a professional meeting) regarding: any aspect of the silicone breast
implant litigation; the conduct of the parties to the litigation; your conclusions as to the relationship between
breast implants and any of the medical conditions (e.g., systemic lupus, erythematosus, rheumatoid arthritis,
scleroderma, polymyalgia) that plaintiﬀs complain of?
9. Do you have any colleagues295 at your institution or others, or a close friend at any institution, who has
conducted research in the area of diseases allegedly caused by silicone breast implants? Have you ever shared
a grant with these individuals? Have you ever co-authored any research publication with these individuals?
10. Have you or members of your household ever been contacted by anyone (e.g., parties, the press, lawyers)
as regards silicone breast implants or the related litigation? What was the extent of this contact?
295“For purposes of this question a colleague is a person with whom you have a signiﬁcant interaction in research, teaching
or administration.” Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Neutral Science
Panels: Two Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation
103 (2001).
7111. Have you ever reviewed a grant proposal or a journal article relating to diseases that might be caused
by silicone breast implants?
Previous Litigation Experience
12. Have you ever served as an expert witness? If so, who were the parties to the action? For whom did you
work? What was the nature of your involvement in that litigation? (e.g., did you prepare reports? testify?
Were you deposed?)
Additional Information
13. Please report any service (full-time or part-time) with federal, state, or local government that may be
related to the silicone breast implant litigation. Also include any other consulting or advisory work with
professional organizations, trade associations, public interest groups, or civic groups that may be related to
the litigation.
14. Is there any other connection between you and any interested party—or any other factor—that might
impair your ability to serve on the Science Panel that has not been addressed by any of the above questions?
Are there factors that others might reasonably construe as creating such impairments?
I have read the “General Statement Concerning Bias and Conﬂict of Interest” and the “Instructions for Com-
pleting the Questionnaire” and have answered the above questions in light of those statements, completely
and to the best of my ability. I know of no reason why I cannot serve the Court as a neutral, unbiased, and
independent expert.
SIGNATURE DATE
72Appendix B: Conﬁdential Financial Disclosure Report for Special Government Employees
(used by the FDA, updated in 2000)296
[REDACTED]
Appendix C: Conﬂict of Interest (“COI”) Criteria Guidance Table (merges Form FDA 3410
waiver criteria document and interim section 502 guidance)297
[REDACTED]
Appendix D: National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualiﬁca-
tions and Aids to Interpretation298
[REDACTED]
296United States Food and Drug Administration, Guidance on Conﬂicts of Interests for Advisory Committee Mem-
bers, Consultants and Experts, Conﬁdential Financial Disclosure Report for Special Government Employees, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/conflictofinterest/disclsoure.pdf (Feb. 2000).
297United States Food and Drug Administration, Guidance on Conﬂicts of Interests for Advi-
sory Committee Members, Consultants and Experts, Conﬂict of Interest Criteria Guidance Table, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/conflictofinterest/table.htm (2000).
298Heath Resources and Services Administration, Oﬃce of Special Programs, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Vaccine
Injury Table and the Qualiﬁcations and Aids to Interpretation, at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/table.htm.
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